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Abstract
Essays on the Political Economy of Governance
Yang Zhou
This dissertation studies the governance structure and its economic impacts in the
Chinese context. Specifically, I use a public choice framework to analyze how insti-
tutions influence economic and political activities of both public officials and private
sectors. Chapter 11 employs the synthetic control method to investigate the effects of
institutions to regional economic development. Chongqing Municipality, a province-
level region in China, had a unique leader from late 2007 to early 2012 who conducted
red ideology movements and legal intervention. The empirical results reveal that al-
though the economic policies promoted the Chongqing economy, the Maoist political
policies partially undermined its economic growth in the short run. Chapter 22 an-
alyzes the collective actions and horizontal bargaining within every political branch
in contemporary China. I argue that this horizontal bargaining within the party is
enhanced by the vertical bargaining. Incorporating Kornai’s work on socialism, the
“party chief and mayor” template extends the bargaining model from one key figure
and one group in the “king and council” template to two key figures and their respec-
tive confidants. In addition, it incorporates institutional constraints into the graphical
model. It also defines a “collective decision probability function,” which shows how the
party chief and mayor model reaches “checks and balances” that limit the policy space,
regardless of whether the policy is exogenous or endogenous. Chapter 3 empirically
tests the theory proposed in the second chapter. It investigates how economic institu-
tions influence the “matching” degree between party chief and mayor across provinces.
In the Chinese context, these city level politicians are appointed, i.e. “elected”, by the
province level politicians who also face institutional constraints. Results suggest that
more economic freedom in one province reduces the difference between party chief and
mayor in the biographical background and career experience components. However,
more economic freedom in one province increases the difference of the ideology compo-
nent between party chief and mayor. The results deepen understanding of institutions’
role in the political system of authoritarian regimes.
1Chapter 1 is the pre-journal-edited version of the following article: Zhou, Y. (2018). Do ideology
movements and legal intervention matter: A synthetic control analysis of the Chongqing Model.
European Journal of Political Economy, 51: 44–56. (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.
2017.03.010). This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Elsevier
Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.
2Chapter 2 is the pre-journal-edited version of the following article: Zhou, Y. (2020). Horizontal
“checks and balances” in the socialist regime: The party chief and mayor template. Journal of
Institutional Economics, 16(1): 65–82. (https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137418000450). This
article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Cambridge University Press
(Millennium Economics Ltd) Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.
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1Chapter 1
Do Ideology Movements and Legal
Intervention Matter: A Synthetic
Control Analysis of the Chongqing
Model
1.1 Introduction
Institutions have a fundamental influence on the economic performance of a regime.
Recent discussions regarding this phenomena can be found in North’s (1990) work.
More specifically, North (1991) emphasizes the importance of ideology, an aspect of
informal institutions, in promoting economic growth. The change of ideology is never a
short-term process, and it is difficult to capture the economic consequences of ideolog-
ical changes quantitatively. However, it is possible to examine the short term effects of
ideological political movements that disrupt normal economic activities. Meanwhile,
legal intervention leads to uncertainty in a regime, which indirectly impedes normal
economic development.
Moreover, people generally think that the development of a region is due to a
specific leader. However, such a leader should not accept all of the credit for rapid
development nor take all of the blame for a stagnant economy because their ability
to influence it is limited. To assert that he/she has some specific effects on a region
is to argue that the economic performance of that region is different with him/her
than without (Grier and Maynard, 2016). In many cases, the leader that earns the
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credit for enhancing economic growth might be a dictator. Barro (1996) investigates
the relationship between democracy and growth. He finds that the mere addition of
democratic institutions is not the key to economic growth. There may, however, be
a weak positive effect for regions with few political rights. Glaeser et al. (2004) also
provide evidence that good policies, which are often pursued by dictators, can help
poor regions get out of poverty. This kind of “leader credit” is widely recognized in
the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In China, government officials have strong
administrative power and are only responsible to the superior department rather than
the people (voters) within their jurisdictional area.
Recently, Chongqing Municipality, one of four province level direct-controlled Chi-
nese municipalities,1 witnessed a time period with pro-development economic policies
and a red ideological political movement. These were started by a unique “dictator”.
This provides a natural experiment for a quantitative analysis of the economic effects
of such political movements. In November 2007, Bo Xilai was promoted to one of
the top 25 party leader positions in the Politburo of the Communist Party of China
(CPC). He was designated as the party chief of Chongqing Municipality. Before his
designation, Bo served as the Minister of Commerce of China (since 2004) and the
governor of Liaoning Province (2001-2004). Under his authority, with the help of pro-
development policies, Chongqing has experienced economic growth at a much higher
rate than other regions of China. However, the Maoist political policies associated
with the “Chongqing Model”2 remain controversial.
In this paper, I use the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) to quantify the economic
effects of Bo’s Maoist political policies. The SCMwas invented by Abadie and Gardeaz-
abal (2003) and further developed by Abadie et al. (2010, 2015). With this method,
I construct a counterfactual Chongqing to compare with the actual Chongqing. This
counterfactual Chongqing lacks red ideological movements and sweeping legal interven-
tions. My results indicate that the economic policies of Bo’s authority have promoted
1The other three are Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. There are 31 province-level regions in main-
land China. Among which, there are four municipalities, five autonomous regions of minority ethnic
groups, and 22 regular provinces. Hong Kong and Macau are two special administrative regions.
Additionally, although China does not have real control of it, Taiwan is claimed to be a province by
PRC.
2The term “Chongqing Model” refers to Bo Xilai’s policy combination. It has been widely dis-
cussed across China. For example, “Analyzing public housing construction in the ‘Chongqing Model,’ ”
by Wang and Cui (2010) in People’s Daily (the most important party press of CPC) discusses
Chongqing’s subsidized public apartments.
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economic development to some extent. Bo’s political movements, on the other hand,
seem to have, in part, impeded Chongqing’s economic development.
The remainder of this essay proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 details the economic
and political sides of Bo’s Chongqing Model. Section 1.3 discusses the synthetic control
method and the data used. Section 1.4 interprets the results and the corresponding
placebo tests, and includes a robustness test. Section 1.5 provides a conclusion and
offers suggestions for further discussion.
1.2 Bo Xilai and the Chongqing Model
The current Chongqing Municipality was separated from Sichuan Province as a
direct-controlled municipality in March 1997. They are both located in the western
area of China, the least developed area in the country. Chongqing City has a three
thousand year history. It was once a municipality of the Republic of China (ROC) and
it served as the wartime capital during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945).
In the current Chinese administrative system, a municipality normally possesses more
political and economic privileges than a mere province.
In the last two decades, there has been an implicit rule in Chinese politics: the
national party leader and the General Secretary of the CPC can have two five-year
terms. Bo’s father, along with Mao Zedong, was one of the cofounders of this socialist
regime and held many important positions at the top level. As one of the Princelings3,
this political heritage enabled Bo to gain political support from former colleagues in
his red family. Even though he was already one of the top 25 elites in a country with
1.35 billion people, his goal was to be more than just a province-level party leader. He
also desired to be on the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) of the CPC. The PSC
normally has less than 10 members who are at the top of China’s pyramid of power.
Bo Xilai took many actions to prove his abilities to the top level ruling class of the
CPC. His aim was to advance in the 2012 “election”4 of the 18th National Congress of
the CPC (Ansfield and Johnson, 2012; Li, 2012a,b). However, his political life ended
in early 2012 after his four years in authority promoting Maoist political movements
3The Princelings are also known as the Party’s Crown Princes, which refer to the descendants of
prominent and influential senior communist officials in the PRC.
4To be more accurate, the “election” is actually “nomination” by the “old guys” and the current
party elites at the top level.
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in Chongqing. Bo Xilai is famous, yet controversial, for his Chongqing Model. His
model featured two reforms: economic and political.
1.2.1 The Economic Side of Bo’s Chongqing Model
The economic side of the Chongqing Model mainly refers to its pro-development
economic policies. Such policies include tax reduction, attracting (foreign and do-
mestic) direct investment, high-tech projects, increasing/shifting government invest-
ment/expenditure, improving social welfare plans, reforming the Hukou system, etc.5
With the network built up by Bo when serving as Minister of Commerce, a series
of tax reductions, and abundant labor with lower wage levels than those in the east
coastal area (Howden and Zhou, 2014), the municipality managed to introduce more
foreign and domestic investment to Chongqing during Bo’s authority relative to the
eastern regions. For example, in 2008, the Chongqing Lianglu Cuntan Free Trade
Port Area was established by the State Council of the PRC. It provides institutional
tariff exemption to foreign trading. Meanwhile, with the help of the China Western
Development program, the corporate income tax rate in capital-intensive, high-tech
and other specific industries in western China was reduced from 25% to 15% (since
2001).6 However, Chongqing also started its own tax reduction in 2008, with a package
of preferential policies including a low corporate income tax of 15% (Bo and Chen,
2009). Such a reduction provides a comparative advantage in attracting corporations
to “vote with their feet” (Tiebout, 1956). Chongqing also managed to hold a series of
commercial and trade promotions. These policy combinations made Chongqing more
appealing to foreign and domestic investors. Chongqing Municipality also improved
its cooperation with Taiwan and the Chinese east coast, which further attracted more
domestic and foreign investment. In 2008, the first year of this new authority, nine
more Fortune Global 500 corporations established their branches in Chongqing. This
increased the total number to 102. Foreign investment utilization was 2.73 billion US
dollars; this increased by 151%. Domestic investment utilization also increased by
5The annual report, since 2008, of Chongqing Municipal People’s Government provides even more
detailed information. http://www.cq.gov.cn/zwgk/zfgzbg/. It is important to note that the
annual report, at the beginning of every year, details the government’s policies and achievements in
the previous year. For example, the 2010 annual report covers the government’s work in 2009.
6However, it is important to note that China Western Development covers 12 province level regions,
including: 6 provinces (Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Yunnan), 5 autonomous
regions (Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, and Xinjiang), and 1 municipality (Chongqing).
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96%.7 In 2009, foreign investment utilization increased by 47.7% and domestic invest-
ment utilization also increased by 74.2%.8 In the post-Bo period, foreign investment
kept increasing. In 2013, the annual foreign investment utilization reached 10.6 bil-
lion US dollars. This is 3.9 times its 2008 level.9 In 2014, annual foreign investment
utilization remained the same as in 2013.10
Its remote geographic location and domestic-focused economy insulated Chongqing
from the worldwide economic crisis. Given the Great Recession, since late 2007 the
relatively developed regions, along the Yangtze River and Pearl River, suffered an
economic slowdown. This was due to a heavy reliance on foreign trade. Chongqing,
however, is located in the hilly area of western China. This means a higher trans-
portation cost for foreign trade. Chongqing’s role as the wartime capital during the
Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) testifies to its distance from the east coast.
This relative geographic disadvantage led Chongqing to rely less on foreign trade than
areas in the east. Thus, the negative influence of the Great Recession on Chongqing
is more moderate. In 2007, the national average of the ratio of foreign trade to GDP
was 39.32%. In Chongqing it was only 9.83%. The ratio of foreign trade to GDP of
Guangdong Province, a famous export region, was 158.08% in 2006. This, however,
decreased to 105.73% in 2009 and 97.72% in 2014. The ratio of another sizable econ-
omy in the east, Jiangsu Province, was 104.13% in 2006. This decreased to 67.15% in
2009 and 53.29% in 2014. The ratio for Chongqing, on the other hand, was 11.16% in
2006 - and it remained around 10% until 2010, after which it started increasing. The
foreign trade to GDP ratio of Chongqing was 29.4%, 33.1% and 41.2% in 2012, 2013
and 2014, respectively. As Figure 1.1 shows, all the provinces experienced a decrease
in foreign trade to GDP in 2008 and 2009 and rebounded in the following two years.
Only Chongqing, however, managed to have a continuous increase after 2011.
Increasing and shifting government expenditures in various sectors is another fea-
ture of the Chongqing Model. Bo Xilai created a “Five Chongqing” slogan in 2008. It
includes five components: “Safe Chongqing,” “Livable Chongqing,” “Forest Chongqing,”
7The 2009 Annual Report of Chongqing Municipal People’s Government. http://www.cq.gov.
cn/zwgk/zfgzbg/2009/1/131096.shtml.
8The 2010 Annual Report of Chongqing Municipal People’s Government. http://www.cq.gov.
cn/zwgk/zfgzbg/2010/12/290524.shtml.
9The 2014 Annual Report of Chongqing Municipal People’s Government. http://www.cq.gov.
cn/zwgk/zfgzbg/2014/1/1199980.shtml.
10The 2015 Annual Report of Chongqing Municipal People’s Government. http://www.cq.gov.
cn/zwgk/zfgzbg/2015/1/1354320.shtml.
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“Healthy Chongqing,” and “Convenient Chongqing.” To achieve these goals, the au-
thority shifted government expenditures to low-rent housing, urban virescence, health
care, and transportation infrastructure. Figure 1.2 depicts the Chongqing expenditure
growth rate, the national growth rate, and the share of Chongqing’s local government
expenditure to the national total. In general, given the increasing share of Chongqing’s
economy to China, Chongqing’s local government expenditure share to the national to-
tal increased gradually from 2008 to 2010. However, 2011 is a unique year because the
local government expenditure growth rate was much higher than the national growth
rate. In that year the share of Chongqing’s local government expenditure to the na-
tional total also increased by 0.46%. There has been, since 2013, a slight decrease
compared to the national level.
Figure 1.3 details the historical share of Chongqing’s local government expenditures
across major sectors. Three sectors, from 2007 to 2014, received a larger share of local
government expenditures: Medical and Health Care, Urban and Rural Community
Affairs, and Transportation.
Moreover, since 2002, to enhance infrastructure investment the Chongqing govern-
ment began reforming infrastructure State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). It not only
managed to consolidate former small sectors and attract diversified funding sources,
but it also set up more professional investment departments and systems. Under Bo’s
new authority, infrastructure construction was one of the main targets of the govern-
ment’s “Five Chongqing” campaign. For example, in 2010, the municipality planned
as many as 39 additional bridges crossing the Yangtze and Jialing rivers (two large
rivers flowing across Chongqing). This helped Chongqing survive the global economic
crisis, especially given the high fixed asset investment in China (Xie, 2009).
Another unique Chongqing reform was to the Hukou system. For decades, it im-
peded the mobility of labor and divided citizens of the same country into two different
groups with different welfare benefits: urban citizens and rural citizens (Howden and
Zhou, 2015). Chongqing began reforming the Hukou system in 2008 (Bo and Chen,
2009; Heberer, 2014). These reforms initiated greater mobility for rural labor to urban
areas and promoted the transactions of the rights of use of rural lands.
Given the nationwide economic growth slowdown, its unique geographic situation,
historical economic structure, and pro-development economic policies (made/implemented
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with the assistance of Mayor Huang Qifan),11 Bo Xilai’s leadership managed to achieve
a more rapid economic growth for Chongqing than the other regions in China. The
economic performance in the pre-Bo era, on the other hand, was similar to the national
level.
As Figure 1.4 shows, in 2006 the GDP growth rate of Chongqing was 12.2%, while
the national average was 12.7%. In 2007, the GDP per capita of Chongqing was only
16,606 CNY. In mainland China it was 21,453 CNY, which was 29% higher than that
of Chongqing. In the same year, the GDP growth rate of Chongqing was 15.9%. This
was slightly higher than the national average (14.2%). However, in more recent years,
Chongqing’s economic growth rate has been much higher than that of the rest of the
country. In 2008, the GDP growth rate of Chongqing was 14.5%; the national average
was merely 9.7%. In 2009, it had a 14.9% growth rate, while the national was just
9.4%. In 2010, the rate for Chongqing was 17.1%. This was considerably larger than
the national average of 10.6%. Recently, in 2014, Chongqing still had a 10.9% growth
rate of GDP, yet the national average was only 7.3%. Chongqing has become one of
the most promising regions of China.
1.2.2 The Political Side of Bo’s Chongqing Model
The other side of the Chongqing Model, the Maoist political movement, has been
controversial.
One of Bo’s Maoist elements relates to ideology.12 Bo Xilai started the “Red Cul-
ture” movement, including (since 2008) municipality-wide organized “singing red songs”
activities. The “red song campaign” required every district, government department,
commercial enterprise, educational institution, and state radio/TV station to begin
“singing red songs” campaigns. The general theme of these songs praises the achieve-
ments of the Communist Party of China. In 2009 he even started a new policy of send-
ing out “red text messages” to the municipality’s 13 million cellphone users. Moreover,
11Huang Qifan started serving in Chongqing Municipality in October 2001. He became the vice
mayor in charge of the financial, fiscal, economic, industry and education sectors in October 2002.
He was promoted to vice party leader in November 2009 and mayor in December 2010. He served as
the mayor of Chongqing until December 2016.
12During, and even after, his term, Bo Xilai and the Chongqing Model attracted the world’s
attention. For example, “The red and the black” in The Economists (2009) documented Chongqing’s
red ideology movements and its crackdown on organized crime. Another example, after Bo’s fall in
Chongqing, was “A populist’s downfall exposes ideological divisions in China’s ruling party” by Wines
(2012). This discussed Bo’s unique ideology in the current Communist Party of China.
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since 2011, all TV channels in Chongqing were forbidden to broadcast commercial ad-
vertisements and were required to broadcast red culture programs or related dramas.
Meanwhile, with the assistance of his confidant Wang Lijun (the current Public
Security Bureau chief and vice mayor of Chongqing), Bo Xilai managed to implement
the so-called “Striking Black” movement. This was a crackdown on so-called “organized
crime.” However, many of the “criminals” arrested were not real criminals. They were
merely political enemies or just ordinary people. The “Striking Black” movement was
part of a broader system of political corruption in China. Kahana and Liu (2010)
investigated this corruption in China. They found that it was the consequence of
the need to finance bribes to superiors. In particular, this occurred when personal
advancement in a bureaucracy involved the payment of bribes. A similar mechanism
among officials exists when there are political movements, and every person wants to
survive. The reason why many local officials strike the “Black” is that they have to
finish the “goals” assigned by their superiors. These superiors decide the political fate
of the local officials. Many people need to choose the “right” side and they do not
know whether they will or will not be “tagged” as a “criminal.” Every person is just
part of the game and, then, they merely “transfer” the pressure they receive from their
superiors to their underlings.13
In 2006, the number of crime cases placed on file by the police department in
Chongqing was 88,203. In 2007 it was 161,920. However, in 2009 and 2010, the
number soared to 201,519 and 204,531, respectively. The number of people sued by
the procuratorate in China increased by 11.3%, from 1,113,319 in 2007 to 1,238,861
in 2011. In Chongqing, however, it increased by 74.4%, from 20,111 in 2007 to 35,083
in 2011 (Qin, 2014). Furthermore, since the legal system in China was under the
control of the government and ultimately the party, the court was also part of the
“Criminal Assembly Line.” In 2007, the number of criminal cases of first instance
accepted by the Chongqing court system was 14,869. This almost doubled to 27,124 in
2011.14 Since 2009, an estimated 5,700 people were arrested in the sweeping campaign
13Such situations often exist in Chinese politics. The supervisors always “transfer” some “goals” to
the underlings. A local official in charge of the One-Child Policy in China told me that if there were
more than three violations of this policy (in one year, in her region - set up by her superiors), her
political career would be ruined. For this reason, she was desperate to monitor potential suspects
and “transfer” political pressure to her underlings. She even employed “brutal” actions to both the
gravidas and underlings.
14Chongqing High People’s Court Annual Report (2007–2014), Chongqing High People’s Procura-
torate Annual Report (2007–2014). Accessed from China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI).
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that ensnared not only criminals, but also businessmen, members of the police force,
judges, government officials and political adversaries, who were accused of corruption
or criminal collaboration (Lubman, 2012).15
Many ordinary people in Chongqing actually like this kind of movement. One
reason is their hostility toward the rich. Additionally, many in the latter group were
tagged as organized criminals. Another reason is that the ideology of many Chinese is
still pro-Maoist. Bo Xilai did not invent Jacobinism and impose it on the Chongqing
people. He was just resurfacing what was rooted in the society as part of the legacy
of the Mao era. The Land Reform Movement targeting land owners in the 1950s and
the Cultural Revolution targeting intellectuals from 1966 to 1976 dramatically shaped
the ideology of this society.16 Bo was in control of Chongqing for just over 4 years;
this was too short for any significant ideological change. All this dictator did was to
reinforce an already existing ideology.
However, red ideology movements and severe legal intervention spread uncertainty
and panic to many others in the country. This is especially true for those who are
aware that the pro-market ideology, economic reform and opening up are the reasons
for China’s economic growth since the late 1970s, even including the other leaders
of the party (Li, 2009). Another concern for the current party elites in the Politburo
Standing Committee is whether such a unique successor will maintain the current ideo-
logical legacy. The informal “dual-generation designation of successors,” an institution
in China since Deng Xiaoping, is a system where the ruler tends to care about his
legacy of greatness and it is thus imperative for him to select a trustworthy succes-
sor to maintain his political privileges and ideology (Zhang, 2011). Another potential
Cultural Revolution is not acceptable for most of the current party elites. The Com-
munist Party of China, which rarely admits its mistakes, even concluded that “...the
‘Cultural Revolution’ has made the party, the state and the people suffer the most
serious setbacks and losses since the founding of this country...”17.
http://www.cnki.net/.
15A famous example in 2009 was Gong Gangmo and his lawyer Li Zhuang. Gong was accused
of organizing crimes. However, his lawyer, Li claimed that Gong had experienced an inquisition
by torture. Li was then framed for perjury and subsequently imprisoned for 18 months by the
“assembly line.” This received wide attention. Many have documented and discussed such “injustices”
in Chongqing during those years. For example, Ran and Zhao (2010) examined this case on a famous
critical press in China, Southern Weekly.
16As a result, the Cultural Revolution changed people’s lives and interrupted education in China
(e.g., Meng and Gregory (2002); Zhou and Hou (1999)).
17Resolution on Several Historical Questions for the Party since the Founding of the People’s
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On March 14, 2012, during the 5th plenary session of the 11th National Peo-
ple’s Congress, the current premier, Wen Jiabao, publicly criticized the Chongqing
authority and warned the public that they should be cautious of the resurgence of the
Cultural Revolution. A day later, Bo Xilai was removed as the Chongqing party chief.
A month later, he was suspended from the politburo. In 2013, Chinese authorities
charged Bo with bribery, abuse of power, and corruption. These charges brought Bo
life imprisonment.
With a combination of these economic policies, ideological movements and legal in-
terventions, how did Bo’s authority influence the economic performance of Chongqing?
Do red ideological movements and legal interventions inhibit economic performance?
1.3 Synthetic Control Method and Data
The Synthetic Control Method (SCM) developed by AAbadie and Gardeazabal
(2003) provides a unique technique to investigate the specific effects of a particular
social shock or a specific political leader. It does so by calculating a synthetic counter-
factual which could not happen and has not happened in the real world. Since then,
a wide body of economic development literature has employed the synthetic control
method. For example, Abadie et al. (2015) estimated the economic impact of the
1990 German reunification on West Germany. They also verified the feasibility and
reliability of using synthetic control analysis in comparative economic studies. In their
paper, they used the investment rate, industry share of total output, inflation, trade
openness, and schooling as five basic predictor variables for GDP per capita. Grier
and Maynard (2016) also employed the synthetic control method to investigate the
economic consequences of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. They found that Chavez had
some unique effects on the region: per capita income fell dramatically and the overall
economic consequences of his administration were bleak. Ribeiro et al. (2013) used the
synthetic control method to conduct a similar study regarding the economic effects of
the 1959 Revolution in Cuba.
All the data used in synthetic control analysis is directly accessed or calculated
Repulic of China, 1981, the Communist Party of China (CPC). Source: the database of the Central
Committees of CPC. http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64563/65374/4526448.
html.
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based on data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC).18 It is the
best available and most widely used source of Chinese province-level data. Since
the data of each region is calculated and reported by the same statistical method,
any potential systematic bias does not matter because the focus is on the relative
difference. Following Abadie et al. (2015), I choose GDP per capita (current CNY)
as the predicted variable. It is calculated via dividing the GDP by population. The
predictor variables in this paper include the ratio of fixed assets investment to GDP,
the ratio of the value added by industry to GDP, the inflation rate (CPI), the ratio of
the amount of foreign trade to GDP, and the portion of the population with a post-
secondary degree. Due to an infrastructure and real estate boom in China in the last
15 years, the ratio of the value added by the construction sector to GDP is also added.
This will allow us to reflect its effect on GDP growth. I also add the total dependency
ratio, which reflects the aging structure of the population. China, after all, employs a
unique One-Child Policy – though different regions have different strictness regarding
their implementation of this policy. More details of the variables used in this SCM are
given in Table 1.1. The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1.2.
Given the availability of the data of some variables, the time period I examine
is from 2002 to 2014. Since Bo became Chongqing party chief in late November of
2007 and had few unique actions in 2007, I count 2007, to avoid a biased estimation,
as a pre-Bo year. His term in Chongqing and his political life ended in March 2012.
Meanwhile, his confidant, Wang Lijun, the current Public Security Bureau chief and
vice mayor of Chongqing, escaped to the Consulate General of the United States in
Chengdu on February 6, 2012. This served as a catalyst for the fall of Bo (Wang,
2012). Thus, 2012 could also be seen as a post-Bo period – given the distraction he
had in early 2012 and his short ruling term in that year.
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) mention that synthetic control results depend upon
the selection of regions that have similar economic characteristics to the one with the
specific intervention; Abadie et al. (2015) also emphasize that restricting the donor
pool might help avoid interpolation biases. Another important reason to restrict the
donor pool is to avoid overfitting (Grier and Maynard, 2016). However, at the same
time, such donor pool selection might lead to unintended bias. There is a trade-off.
The main results of this paper are based on the donor pool with all other 30 province
18http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/.
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level regions in Mainland China (excluding Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan).19
A counterfactual Chongqing is calculated by the synthesis, based on their economic
performance (GDP per capita) between 2002 and 2007 and the predictor variables of
each province-level region. The time period from 2008 to 2011 contains a mixture of
the pro-development economic policies and the negative political movements of Bo’s
authority. However, Huang Qifan kept serving as the mayor of Chongqing today with
a similar bundle of economic policies until December 2016. Thus, the period 2012 to
2014 is viewed as a time period with similar economic policies but without Maoist
political movements.
1.4 Results and Interpretation
1.4.1 Main Results and Placebo Test
The main results are given in the following tables. Table 1.3 gives the weight for
each province region in the donor pool. Six out of the 30 regions have a non-zero
weight. Jiangxi Province has a 0.161 weight, Shandong Province has a 0.242 weight,
Tibet has a 0.012 weight, Ningxia has a 0.163 weight, Xinjiang has a 0.240 weight, and
Guizhou Province (the neighbor of Chongqing), has a 0.182 weight. Table 1.4 gives
the predictor balance. Except for the foreign trade to GDP ratio and education, all
other predictor variables are a good match.
Although Bo ruled Chongqing for merely one month in 2007, the economic per-
formance in that year already was slightly outperforming the synthetic one. His pre-
decessor, Wang Yang, also has a good reputation for governing. From 2008 to 2011,
the gap remained at the same level; the economic performance of Chongqing was bet-
ter than the Synthetic Chongqing. However, since 2012 when Bo left office, the gap
19In order to address a potential over-fitting concern, a synthetic control analysis with 18 province
level regions in the donor poor is also run as a robustness test. Five autonomous regions of minority
ethnic groups are excluded (Xinjiang, Ningxia, Guangxi, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia) due to their
unique political and ethnic differences. Qinghai, Gansu, and Yunnan are excluded due to their
unique geographic patterns. Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang are also excluded due to their declining
economies. These economies languished due to the large-share of inefficient State Owned Enterprises
(SOEs) and the increasing number of emigrants. Moreover, the Northeastern provinces, which are
close to North Korea and Russia, are located far away from Chongqing. The last normal province
excluded is Hainan. It is a large island north of the South China Sea. Those remaining in the
donor pool are: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi,
Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Sichuan, Guizhou, and Shaanxi. However, I should
note that this 18-province donor pool result provides similar conclusions to the complete donor pool.
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has grown larger. The current mayor of Chongqing, Huang Qifan, has been in office
since January 2010; he has employed similar economic policies. Moreover, neither of
the following two post-Bo party chiefs have had any significantly unique actions and
they have continued to maintain similar economic policies. Therefore, we can view
the post-Bo Chongqing regime as a government with a similar economic direction but
with a different political situation: lacking red ideological movements and severe legal
intervention.
From Figure 1.5, it is evident that the gap between Chongqing and the Synthetic
Chongqing has been increasing since 2012. The most fundamental difference between
the Bo period and post-Bo period is the lack-or-presence of red ideological movements
and legal intervention. Although the economic policies contributed to relatively faster
economic growth during Bo’s authority, the ideological movements and legal interven-
tion partly counteracted such effects. Once Bo left office, the economic performance
of Chongqing improved. It is important to note that the economic growth of China,
after the Great Recession, has slowed. However, provided this background, the growth
rate of the post-Bo Chongqing still retains a similar, or even faster, speed than before.
The other provinces’ growth rates, on the other hand, have decreased.
To avoid mistaking random differences as real effects, a placebo test is required.
The test investigates the other regions (not experiencing the Bo Xilai shock) by
the same method and checks whether it has a similar “treated effect,” but without
Chongqing in the donor pools (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010).
Since the provincial economies are unequal in China, the absolute difference between
a province and its synthetic counterfactual may not be comparable. Therefore, a
comparable relative difference is calculated by dividing the absolute difference by the
synthetic counterfactual. As Figure 1.6 shows, there are six to seven out of the other
30 provinces having a larger relative increase than Chongqing from 2008 to 2011. In
2014, there are only four provinces having a larger relative increase. This placebo test
gives moderate support to the claim that Chongqing’s economic performance, between
2008 and 2011, was relatively better than most other provinces in China.
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1.4.2 Results with Consumption Data
As Section 1.2 describes, some of Bo’s economic policies were to directly increase
government expenditures. From 2008 to 2011, the growth rate of Chongqing’s local
government expenditures was higher than the national level. Meanwhile, the share of
Chongqing’s local government expenditures in the national total also increased during
that period. Government expenditures directly contribute to GDP, since Y=C+I+G.
In order to rule out the direct contribution of government expenditures to GDP and
to, instead, focus on the indirect growth effect from shifts in government expendi-
tures, I use consumption as the measurement of economic performance. This serves
as a robustness test, with the predictor variables and the donor pool remaining the
same. The only province level consumption data available from the National Bureau
of Statistics of China is household consumption expenditures. Per capita data would
be ideal. However, since the counterfactual also uses per household data, it should
provide comparable results in a synthetic control analysis.
Table 1.5 gives the weight of other regions in the donor pool for Chongqing. Table
1.6 reports the predictor balance. With household consumption as the measure of
economic performance, five provinces have a positive weight. Figure 1.7 shows that
the household consumption from 2008 to 2011 remained small, while the gap increased
once the political movements were dissolved (after 2012). The placebo test shown in
Figure 1.8 reveals, however, that roughly half of the other provinces had a higher
relative increase in household consumption from 2008 to 2011. Moreover, there are
still around 10 provinces that have higher consumption increases in the post-Bo period.
The placebo test does not provide strong support.
1.4.3 Robustness test
Although the evidence found indicates that the economic performance in the Bo
era and post-Bo era are different, the synthetic control method is normally used for
evaluating policy effects when it is first implemented. A further robustness test is
needed to distinguish between policy shifts that occurred in the different periods.
From 2008 to 2014, Chongqing was the only provincial region in China that had
such a dramatic institutional change in 2012. A similar synthetic control calculation
was conducted, taking the period from 2008 to 2011 as the predictor period and 2012
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(when both Bo and his political movements were removed) as the treated year. If
the Maoist political movements had negative effects on the economic performance of
Chongqing, we should witness faster economic growth after 2012.
Figure 1.9 gives the synthetic control result of GDP per capita, and Figure 1.10
is the corresponding placebo test. Chongqing’s GDP per capita is much higher than
the synthetic counterfactual, and the placebo test provides strong evidence that this
effect is not random. In 2012 there were three provinces with a higher relative growth,
and there were two in 2013. In 2014, Chongqing had the highest relative growth in
China. Figure 1.11 gives the result with household consumption. Figure 1.12 is the
corresponding placebo test. Although the household consumption in Chongqing is also
higher than the synthetic counterfactual, the placebo test fails to give strong support.
The evidence indicates that Chongqing’s GDP per capita significantly increased after
the removal of Bo, while the relative growth of household consumption was insignifi-
cant. The lagged effects of investment and government expenditure have not started
to significantly boost consumption. Meanwhile, after Bo left, government expenditure
also decreased relative to other regions. Additionally, the fixed assets investment ratio
to GDP in Chongqing was similar to those of the regions with a positive weight in the
donor pool. The relatively higher GDP per capita growth since 2012 can be explained
in that it was partly due to the removal of the Maoist political movements, which
distorted normal economic activity during the Bo era.
1.5 Discussion and Conclusion
The evidence from Chongqing via employing the synthetic control method reveals
that Bo Xilai’s economic policies have had some positive economic effects. The red
ideological movements and the legal interventions motivated by his political ambition,
to some extent, counteract the positive economic effects. Household consumption does
not have a significant increase since 2012; this indicates that the lagged effects of
investment are still small. The removal of the Maoist political movements (including
red propaganda and the crackdown on so-called “organized crime”) has, since 2012, led
to a higher GDP per capita growth. This study can only capture the short term effects
of such dramatic “movements” because this natural experiment just happened recently.
Ideological status is persistent and legal intervention can have long term effects. It is
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worthwhile to keep tracking this valuable case.
Meanwhile, it is important to note that the Chongqing Model and even the overall
Chinese Model, in recent years, are characterized by high investment rates led by the
government. In some provinces, the ratio of yearly fixed assets investment to GDP is
even higher than 100% in the last several years, which implies that the current GDP
of China is pushed up by infrastructure construction and real estate development. For
example, the ratio for Chongqing in 2013 and 2014 was 81.63% and 86.14%, and the
ratio for Sichuan was 77.02% and 81.71%, respectively. Guizhou Province, which has
a positive weight for both regions, had a 91.18% and 97.40% fixed assets investment
to GDP ratio in 2013 and 2014, respectively. However, in 2006, the year before the
global economic crisis, the ratio in Chongqing, Sichuan and Guizhou was 61.61%,
50.78% and 51.19%, respectively. There is no doubt that this centrally planned regime
was employing its power to force investment at a higher rate. Additionally, concerns
remain regarding how long an 80% or even 90% investment rate can last. The bubble
will burst when inflation is stopped.
Chongqing is a less developed region in China in terms of GDP per capita, and this
provides more room for its economic development. Being a municipality also endows
it with political privileges. However, it is clear that Chongqing has had faster growth
than other regions in China within the last decade. This is partly due to the economic
policies of Bo Xilai and his successors. Meanwhile, the different GDP per capita gap
between the real Chongqing and the Synthetic Chongqing in the Bo era and post-
Bo era, indicates that the red ideological movements and legal intervention by this
“dictator” had a negative impact on economic growth. The negative impact has been
observed in the short run while the long term impacts are still unknown.
Tables and Figures
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Table 1.1: Definitions and Sources of Variables in the Synthetic Control Analysis
Variable Definition Period Source
GDP Per
Capita
In Current CNY 2002-
2014
NBSC Annual Data by Province - National




In Current CNY 2002-
2014
NBSC Annual Data by Province - National





Percentage of Fixed Assets In-
vestment in GDP (Level data
divided by GDP )
2002-
2014
NBSC Annual Data by Province - Invest-
ment in Fixed Assets and Real Estate - To-




Percentage of Industry Contri-




NBSC Annual Data by Province - National




Contribution in GDP (Level
data divided by GDP)
2002-
2014
NBSC Annual Data by Province - National
Accounts - Gross Regional Product
Inflation Consumer Price Index (CPI) 2002-
2014
NBSC Annual Data by Province - Price





Percentage of Foreign Import
and Export to GDP (Level data
in USD converted into current
CNY then divided by GDP)
2002-
2014
NBSC Annual Data by Province - Foreign
Trade and Economic Cooperation - Total





Percentage of population with a
post-secondary degree (Sample
ratio data or census level data
divided by total population)
2002-
2014
NBSC Annual Data by Province - Popu-
lation - Total Population/Population Data




Ratio of population aged un-
der 14 and above 65 (inclusive)
to that aged between 15 and
64 (Sample ratio data or cen-




NBSC Annual Data by Province - Popu-
lation - Total Population/Population Data
from Sample Survey- Age Composition and
Dependency Ratio of Population
Note: All data, with the exception of post-secondary and age composition data in 2010, was obtained
from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) at: http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/
easyquery.htm?cn=E0103. Post-secondary and age composition data in 2010 is not available in that
data set and was obtained from the 2010 census from NBSC, available online at: http://www.stats.
gov.cn/tjsj/pcsj/rkpc/6rp/indexch.htm.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Synthetic Control Analysis
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Chongqing
GDP Per Capita 23485.88 13579.98 7934.83 47685.06
Household Consumption 8561.62 4674.45 3204.00 17262.00
Fixed Assets Investment (%) 67.12 15.28 40.27 86.14
Industry Value Share (%) 40.68 4.38 35.29 46.85
Construction Value Share (%) 8.24 0.59 7.66 9.49
Inflation (%) 2.42 2.17 -1.60 5.60
Foreign Trade to GDP (%) 16.28 11.08 6.65 41.18
Post-secondary Ratio (%) 6.22 3.21 3.14 12.12
Dependency Ratio (%) 43.53 3.78 38.90 52.48
All 31 Province Level Regions in China
GDP Per Capita 27669.97 20022.38 3240.63 103671.26
Household Consumption 9461.88 6687.64 2301.00 43007.00
Fixed Assets Investment (%) 59.07 20.13 25.36 124.22
Industry Value Share (%) 38.97 9.65 7.03 53.04
Construction Value Share (%) 7.30 3.41 3.25 29.40
Inflation (%) 2.69 2.12 -2.30 10.10
Foreign Trade to GDP (%) 32.67 40.57 3.58 172.30
Post-secondary Ratio (%) 8.19 5.68 0.73 39.30
Dependency Ratio (%) 37.72 7.16 19.30 61.55
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Table 1.3: Estimated Synthetic Control Weights of Each Province in the Donor Pool
for Chongqing (GDP Per Capita)
Region Weight Region Weight Region Weight
Beijing 0 Zhejiang 0 Hainan 0
Tianjin 0 Anhui 0 Sichuan 0
Hubei 0 Fujian 0 Guizhou 0.182
Shanxi 0 Jiangxi 0.161 Yunnan 0
Inner Mongolia 0 Shandong 0.242 Tibet 0.012
Liaoning 0 Henan 0 Shaanxi 0
Jilin 0 Hubei 0 Gansu 0
Heilongjiang 0 Hunan 0 Qinghai 0
Shanghai 0 Guangdong 0 Ningxia 0.163
Jiangsu 0 Guangxi 0 Xinjiang 0.240
Table 1.4: Predictor Balance for Chongqing (GDP Per Capita)
Variables Chongqing Synthetic Chongqing
Fixed Assets Investment (%) 53.44 52.72
Industry Value Share (%) 38.24 38.24
Construction Value Share (%) 7.83 7.83
Inflation (%) 1.97 1.97
Foreign Trade to GDP (%) 9.83 17.96
Post-secondary Ratio (%) 3.68 5.66
Dependency Ratio (%) 43.70 43.66
GDP Per Capita (2007) (Current CNY) 16605.58 16876.54
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Table 1.5: Estimated Synthetic Control Weights of Each Province in the Donor Pool
for Chongqing (Household Consumption)
Region Weight Region Weight Region Weight
Beijing 0 Zhejiang 0.042 Hainan 0
Tianjin 0 Anhui 0 Sichuan 0
Hubei 0 Fujian 0 Guizhou 0
Shanxi 0 Jiangxi 0 Yunnan 0
Inner Mongolia 0.512 Shandong 0 Tibet 0.124
Liaoning 0 Henan 0.155 Shaanxi 0
Jilin 0 Hubei 0 Gansu 0
Heilongjiang 0 Hunan 0.166 Qinghai 0
Shanghai 0 Guangdong 0 Ningxia 0
Jiangsu 0 Guangxi 0 Xinjiang 0
Table 1.6: Predictor Balance for Chongqing (Household Consumption)
Variables Chongqing Synthetic Chongqing
Fixed Assets Investment (%) 53.44 53.38
Industry Value Share (%) 38.24 34.11
Construction Value Share (%) 7.83 8.18
Inflation (%) 1.97 2.35
Foreign Trade to GDP (%) 9.83 10.67
Post-secondary Ratio (%) 3.68 4.94
Dependency Ratio (%) 43.70 37.30
GDP Per Capita (2007) (Current CNY) 6453.00 6378.01
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Figure 1.1: Foreign Trade to GDP ratio of Chongqing, the Other Municipalities, and
Major Eastern Provinces
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC).
Figure 1.2: Local Government Expenditure of Chongqing and the National Total
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC).
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Figure 1.3: Share of Major Local Government Expenditures of Chongqing
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC).
Figure 1.4: Annual GDP Growth of China and Chongqing
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC).
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Figure 1.5: The Real Chongqing and the Synthetic Chongqing (GDP Per Capita)
Figure 1.6: Placebo Test for Chongqing (GDP Per Capita)
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Figure 1.7: The Real Chongqing and the Synthetic Chongqing (Household Consump-
tion)
Figure 1.8: Placebo Test for Chongqing (Household Consumption)
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Figure 1.9: The Real Chongqing and the Synthetic Chongqing Post 2008 (GDP Per
Capita)
Figure 1.10: Placebo Test for Chongqing Post 2008 (GDP Per Capita)
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Figure 1.11: The Real Chongqing and the Synthetic Chongqing Post 2008 (Household
Consumption)
Figure 1.12: Placebo Test for Chongqing Post 2008 (Household Consumption)
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Chapter 2
Horizontal “Checks and Balances” in
the Socialist Regime: The Party Chief
and Mayor Template
2.1 Introduction
Kornai’s pioneering scholarship examined the mechanisms of the socialist system.
The “soft budget constraint” (SBC) formulated by Kornai (1979, 1980, 1986) has been
widely acknowledged in the contemporary economics literature (especially in the liter-
ature of socialist economics and economics of transition, e.g. Csaba (1995); Kolodko
(2000); Nuti (1986); Qian and Roland (1998), etc. Furthermore, Kornai et al. (2003)
give a very detailed review of the literature of the soft budget constraint). Kornai
(1992) also systematically discusses the details of the socialist system, especially fo-
cusing on the economic factors. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kornai’s
main focus was on the transition process in former socialist countries in central eastern
Europe, especially his native Hungary (e.g., Kornai (1990, 2006)).
The main goal of Kornai’s work is to provide a positive analysis of the economies
within the socialist system, and he connects their political characteristics with their
economic circumstances. The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism
(Kornai, 1992) comprehensively examines the sophisticated mechanisms of the socialist
system, which were and still are universal. Even though it has been more than two
decades since the publication of this masterpiece, many of these mechanisms are still
present in modern socialist countries. Kornai (1992) highlights that there are no
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horizontal “checks and balances” from outside of the party in socialist regimes, and the
party is always striving to maintain its power. Kornai (1986, 1992) also explains the
weak “vertical bargaining” (“bargaining between superior and subordinate”) within the
party, which leads to the “ratchet effect” (Berliner, 1952).
With the broad picture of the socialist system given, how bargaining within every
party branch proceeds can be more clearly illustrated. There are no de facto “checks
and balances”1 from outside of the party, and it is mostly vertically ordered obeisance
from the top to the bottom within the party. However, how do the politicians in the
same party and government branch bargain with each other? More specifically, in
the contemporary Chinese political structure, the top two de facto powerful figures in
different branches on different levels are the party chief of the Communist Party of
China (CPC) branch and the leader of the corresponding government sector, who is
also a party member in most cases. Are there any “checks and balances” between the
two, with intended or unintended designing from the top?
Meanwhile, the division of power between the several central leaders within every
political group has existed for thousands of years. There is a lot of research in the po-
litical economy literature studying the checks and balances mechanism (e.g. Shapley
and Shubik (1954) on how to evaluate the division of power in a committee system,
North and Weingast (1989) on the evolutions of institutions governing public choice in
England in the seventeenth century, Haney et al. (1992) on conflict resolution combin-
ing theory and empirical evidence from lab experiment, and Congleton (2001, 2011)
on the king and council template and how the modern western democracy emerged.),
while none of these has investigated that in the socialist regime. The socialist sys-
tem claims to have its unique “democratic centralism”, which defends the existence of
“democracy” in socialist regimes. However, the voting process is not real, and most
decisions are not made by real voting but rather, various political bargains. Can we
borrow any tools from the political economy literature on “western” “checks and bal-
ances” to investigate the horizontal bargaining among the central officials within every
branch in the socialist system, which has not been as extensively studied?
Therefore, my research contributes to the current literature in four ways. First,
1“Checks and balances” means competition and mutual restraint among the various branches of
government or party, which is typically the result of a designed political mechanism with separated
powers.
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inspired by and following the analyses on socialist systems by János Kornai, I examine
the political system in China, one of the few remaining modern socialist regimes.
Kornai (2000) describes two historical types of transitions and notes that China might
be a new, third type. However, the political system in China has been changing
much more slowly than the economic system, and the political system has continued
to become more authoritarian and centralized in the last six years with more power
gathered to the top, under the ruling of Xi Jinping. Second, this paper provides
an institutional explanation of the bipolar division of power within every branch in
socialist regimes, which is also an extension of Kornai’s work. Although there are no
horizontal “checks and balances” from outside of the party (Kornai, 1992), there are
horizontal ones within every cell of the party-state, which is partially enhanced by the
vertical bargaining (Kornai, 1979, 1980, 1986). Third, the king and council template
(Congleton, 2001) focuses on the assignment of power between the “one-man” and the
“committee.” However, the king never bargains alone, and there are often confidants
serving in his council, either attracted to him by political interests or placed in the
positions by himself. This paper expands the king and council template to a more
generalized one, where both the king and the premier have their own confidants in the
committees. Since this paper illustrates this expanded template with the contemporary
politics in China ruled by the Communist Party of China, it is named the “party
chief and mayor” template. Last but not least, the party chief and mayor template
also provides a new perspective with institutional constraints added into the graphic
model. Meanwhile, a “collective decision probability function” is provided based on
this template, and the solution shows how the system of “checks and balances” works
which ultimately limits the policy space, regardless of whether the policy is exogenous
or endogenous. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper employing the king
and council template to explain political bargaining schemes in socialist regimes.
2.2 The Party Chief and Mayor Template
2.2.1 Horizontal Political Bargaining in the Socialist System
One important feature of politics is partisanship. In a modern democratic regime,
there can be many parties. In a one-party regime, there might be other parties but
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without real ruling power.2 However, even in a one-party regime, officials within
the same party or government branch normally fall into different interest and ideology
groups. Grouping themselves into small units and defending against the others outside
their own small group is a natural human instinct (Hayek, 1988).
China is normally viewed as a one-party state, while there is a mechanism for di-
viding political power within the governments on the same level and different levels.
Although the party is separated nominally from the government, most government
officials and leaders are also party members, and there is a party branch in every gov-
ernment sector Kornai (1992, 2000). One interesting phenomenon is that the party,
government, congress, and other mass organizations share the same office building on
the village, town, county, and city levels in China. On the province and nation levels,
they are normally located in different buildings, mainly due to the greater fiscal capac-
ity. This is also how the Communist Party tries to show the relative “independence”
between the party and government, congress, and other mass organizations.
For more details of the general features of how the party permeates into every
sector of the socialist regime, I strongly recommend the readers to read The Socialist
System: The Political Economy of Communism (Kornai, 1992), which is an encyclo-
pedia of the socialist system with a main focus on the economic factors. Even though
it was published 26 years ago, most of the mechanisms described are still running
very similarly in contemporary China.3 The political power of the party chief and
the mayor/governor/premier within the same branch are comparable. However, in
most situations, the party chiefs have relatively more political power than the may-
ors/governors/premier on all the levels, while the party chiefs may have less power
in universities, bureaus, and the military.4 Meanwhile, the People’s Congress is the
2In the Preamble of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (the 1982 document,
amended in 2018), it states that the other democratic parties are led by the Communist Party of
China: “...In building socialism it is essential to rely on workers, peasants and intellectuals and to
unite all forces that can be united. In the long years of revolution and construction, there has been
formed under the leadership of the Communist Party of China a broad patriotic united front which
is composed of the democratic parties and people’s organizations and which embraces all socialist
working people, all builders of socialism, all patriots who support socialism, and all patriots who
stand for the reunification of the motherland...”
3For readers interested in the details of the contemporary Communist Party of China, McGregor
(2010) gives an excellent overview.
4In the Chinese military, the officials in charge of ideology propaganda are named “political com-
missars” (above battalion level, inclusive) or “political instructors” (on company level), who have the
same level political power as the military commanders of the same military unit. A similar structure
has also existed in the Red Army of the Soviet Union, the Republic of China Army, and the German
army of the Nazi Germany. It can even be traced back to the “commissaire politique” (political com-
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nominal legislature body on every level and the National People’s Congress is the par-
liament. However, they generally do not have real political power. All in all, the party
controls the power.
The political legitimacy of the party’s leadership has been given by the Constitu-
tion. In the current Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (the 1982 document,
amended in 2018)5, it highlights the leadership of the CPC in the Preamble:
“...Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance
of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the
Important Thought of Three Represents, Scientific Outlook on Develop-
ment, and Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
for a New Era, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere
to the people’s democratic dictatorship and the socialist road...”
Using terms from Chinese politics to illustrate, there is a party chief, who is the
leader from the Communist Party, and a mayor/governor/premier (for simplicity,
mayor will be used as the main term, which stands for all different types of gov-
ernment leaders), who is the nominal leader of every government branch. Both of
them have relatively strong political power, and the main reason for the mayor or
equivalent to have power is because he/she is also a party member. There are many
other officials in the committees, either of the party, government, congress, or other
mass organizations, and they also have political power to some extent.6 Whether the
policy preference of a committee member is closer to the party chief or the mayor is
not dependent on his/her position category: being in the party committee does not
necessarily mean that this member’s preference is closer to that of the party chief’s,
and this is also true for a government committee member. Meanwhile, some officials
serve in more than one committee at the same time. In short, all of the other officials
are “distributed” around the two key leaders, regardless of their nominal committee
category. Most of these officials in different committees are party members, and the
missary) in the French Revolution (1789-99), who guarded it against anti-Revolutionary thought and
action.
5The Chinese version of the latest document can be found on the website of the National Peo-
ple’s Congress, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2018-03/22/content_2052621.htm
(accessed May 15, 2018). An English version of the 2018 amendment is not available yet, but the
English version of the 2004 amendment can be found on the official website of the State Council of the
People’s Republic of China, http://english.gov.cn/archive/laws_regulations/2014/08/
23/content_281474982987458.htm (accessed May 15, 2018). The English translation is based on
the official version of the 2004 amendment and incorporates the changes in the 2018 amendment.
6There are generally around 10-15 such officials in the local (province, city, county, town) govern-
ments nowadays.
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one or two non-party members are needed to show people that there is still some sort
of “democracy” left (Xu, 2004). Usually, there are also one or two female committee
members for a semblance of political correctness (Goodman, 2002; Xu, 2004). Also,
working in a position for the party, government, congress, or other mass organizations
does not necessarily decide where his/her (since most politicians in China are male,
he/his will be used in the following context for simplicity) position will be in the future,
because of the “interweaving” situation (Kornai, 1992).
In this bipolar setting, the party chief has very strong political power, both veto
power and agenda control. So does the mayor, albeit slightly weaker than the party
chief, but much stronger than the other normal committee members. The party chief
takes care of every issue, with a focus on broad ones, e.g. personnel appointments.
The mayor also needs to address all issues, with a focus on trivial local issues, e.g.
fiscal income and expenditure. Each of the other committee members is in charge of
one specific sector: finance, industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education,
public security, military, civil affair, discipline inspection and supervision, ideological
publicity, personal organization, etc. In other words, each committee member serves as
a specialist in one sector, dealing with issues in that sector and providing advice to the
two key leaders. In principle, these non-leader officials can also make policy proposals,
especially those in their respective sectors. In most situations, a policy or decision
needs a final “unanimous consent” or at least a final “majority consent” to get approved,
after a few rounds of implicit and explicit bargaining. The “votes” among the officials
are documented and reported to the upper level party and government organizations.
However, most of the decisive power is divided between only the party chief and
the mayor, while the other committee members provide their specialized knowledge.
Especially, since 2013, Xi Jinping has highlighted that the party and government
leaders in local governments share the same responsibilities. Either the party chief or
the mayor makes mistakes, both of them will share the same responsibilities (Yang,
2015). This further pushes the party chief and the mayor to bargain over every major
issue to achieve consent before making the final decision which will be reported to the
higher level government.
Though the main focus of this paper is on the bargaining of policies between the
party chief and the mayor within the party/government system, it is important to
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note that the party chief and the mayor are facing various incentives, including both
the inside ones within the ruling political group and the outside ones from the people.
For example, Chen et al. (2016) conduct a field experiment in China and find that
threats of collective actions and threats of tattling to upper levels of government make
county governments more responsive to civil issues. Landry (2008) argues that the
Communist Party of China still maintains the ultimate controls of the cadres, even
though the “recent” (by 2008) reforms have led to extensive decentralization. Manion
(2014) suggests that the local congressional representation in China is functioning
more and more as authoritarian parochialism, rather than just a nominal one without
real representation. This mechanism is actually an “extra-legislative activity of pork-
barrel politics” (Manion, 2014). Pesqué-Cela et al. (2009) also find that self-governing
organizations do exist, and are more likely to exist, where the people have less political
trust in local governments.
Meanwhile, China’s bureaucracy has grown and responded to social demands for
state provision in a way different from the early European bureaucracies. China’s par-
ticular form of decentralization, “market-preserving federalism”, provides the critical
foundations for market success (Qian and Weingast, 1996). Qian et al. (1999) also
explain the differences in reform strategies between China and Eastern Europe, from
an organization theory perspective: rather than the centralized “U-form” in relatively
small-sized countries in Eastern Europe, China’s “M-form” is more flexible and enables
more local experiments. This flexibility for local governments enables the party chief
and the mayor to bargain on many local policy issues with a constraint, rather than
just obeying the orders from the top.
Also, as explained in Kornai (1992), both price and non-price signals affect offi-
cials’ incentives. For example, GDP and fiscal revenue are explicit price signals of
the economic and political performances of the local bureaucrats. The civil com-
ponents are non-price signals of people’s feedback on the current ruling of the local
bureaucrats. Both types of signals will be accepted by themselves and will also be
transmitted (directly or indirectly) to upper level governments and incorporated into
the cadre evaluation system, thus shaping local officials’ decision incentives dynami-
cally. Meanwhile, in order to secure their relative influences, e.g. by providing more
benefits to their confidants who serve as normal committee members or by competing
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with peers serving in parallel governments, the party chief and the mayor will expe-
rience “investment hunger syndrome” (Kornai, 1992). Xu (2015) gives a very detailed
overview of investment competition by local governments in China. Officials are politi-
cal entrepreneurs, who seek political opportunities and also need to “recruit” economic
entrepreneurs to their parish. They do so in order to enhance their economic, and thus
political performances, and extract more rents.
Ultimately, there are four main reasons for this bipolar division of power in the
socialist system. First, it is a natural result of evolution within the political systems
in human history and also a result of the specific modern history of China. In almost
all societies, even in the most authoritarian ones, from the past to present, there are
always challenging political forces within the core group. It may be strong or weak,
and it changes over time. Hu (2005) documents the history of the combination of polit-
ical and economic management, which is a historical heritage of the “party-leading-all”
structure during wartime before the establishment of People’s Republic of China in
1949. During wartime, the party led and controlled the military and the government.
After 1949, there was a trend of separating the party and the government in the fol-
lowing several years: instead of giving direct instructions to the government, the party
should give just general guidance without touching specific issues. However, since the
mid-1950’s, the party gained more power and started giving more direct orders, and
both political and economic managements were consolidated into this party-leading-
government bureaucratic system. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the
party, the government, and the military sectors were all paralyzed, and all the power
was in the hands of the Central Cultural Revolution Group and various revolutionary
committees on different levels. After the Cultural Revolution, the division between
party and governance returned to a semblance of normality, and the economic growth
under the decentralized system since the Reform and Opening-up in 1978 made the
economic development an increasingly important issue in the contemporary bureau-
cracy system.
Second, dividing the power between two or more subordinates in lower branches,
which induces fighting, is the best way to make them obey orders from the top in
order to maintain or achieve more political power. Similar observations are also doc-
umented in Kornai (1992). Though being “horizontal”, this bipolar bargaining is ac-
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tually enhanced by the “vertical” bargaining, especially given the decentralization of
local governments in China (Qian and Roland, 1998). With the economic development
since the Reform and Opening-up in 1978, the local governments have more and more
fiscal revenues and self-contained political powers under the regionally decentralized
authoritarian system (Xu, 2015). One unintended consequence of the bipolar set up in
local bureaucracy system is that allowing the competition within a local government
(a party chief, mayor, and many normal committee members) makes these officials
obey orders from higher levels better, in exchange for more political support from the
upper levels. Thus, the horizontal bipolar bargaining between the party chief and the
mayor helps avoid local governments being a kingdom of just one person (either the
party chief or the mayor), but keeps them remaining loyal to and obeying orders from
upper level governments, ultimately the central government.
Third, no central planners can ever overcome the knowledge or information prob-
lem, and they have to make some “natural division of labor” (Kornai, 1992; Kornai
et al., 2003). For example, Bendor and Meirowitz (2004) explain why in some situations
delegation is the optimal policy for bosses when facing uncertainty and information
problems by a spatial model approach, and they also specify a specific case when there
is more than one boss.
Last but not least, the “checks and balances” can help maintain the public image
of “democracy” in socialist counties, which defends the legitimacy of their regimes.
Again, this “democracy” is not only to make the citizens feel they are not dictated by
a specific bureaucrat in the town they live in, but also to grant the officials on upper
levels more control over the officials on lower levels. Hence, the top-down pyramid is
maintained.
2.2.2 The King and Council Template
The “king and council” template defined by Congleton (2001) provides an insti-
tutional mechanism for political bargaining, featuring the bipolar division previously
described. The allocation of the power of agenda control and veto between the king
and the council affects the potential bargaining equilibrium. Based on this template,
Congleton (2001, 2007) further illustrates how the western democracy system was
gradually achieved “from royal to parliamentary rule without revolution” in the last
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several centuries.
More specifically, this template assumes that the king has most of the power in the
beginning, controlling most of the agenda and veto. However, due to the informational
advantages of consulting the council, both kings with rational expectations and kings
who are rationally ignorant would prefer having a council. Thus, the king gives more
and more agenda control or veto power to the council over time, and this is how
peaceful bargaining between the king and the council evolves.
As Figure 2.1 shows, in the original king and council template, the king’s most
ideal policy combination is at point K. The distance from the ideal point is assumed
to characterize his rank of orders of alternative policies: the further a point is away from
his ideal point, the less utility he has. The points on the same circle (indifference curve)
thus yield the same utility to the king. Similarly, the council members’ respective
points of policy combination are A, B, and C, where B stands for both the median
voter and his ideal policy combination point. In some situations, the median voter is
the leader of the council (the pivotal member, e.g. the premier). Also, B will be the
outcome voted within the council because it is the ideal point of the median voter.
Veto power and agenda control are the two main political powers in the king and
council bargaining template. When the council is decisive, in other words, both of
the branches are actually capable of making policy decisions, either branch of the
government’s ideal point can be defended by that branch as long as it has either veto
power or agenda control (Congleton, 2001, 2007) . If the king has agenda control, then
he can just propose policy combination K. The council confronts the choice between K
and K, and clearly the result will be K regardless of whether the council votes for the
policy or not. If the king has veto power and the council has agenda control, then any
point deviated from K proposed by the council can be vetoed by the king. A similar
situation will still hold for Point B if the council has either the veto power or agenda
control. The council can also be non-decisive, or weak. In other words, there is not
any pivotal voter in the council. Thus, every possible proposal can be defeated by a
counter proposal before it is put into practice by the executive, due to the potential
majoritarian cycles. In such situations, the king can also confidently secure his ideal
point.
There has been a growing literature analyzing the political institutions incorpo-
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rating the king and council template, e.g. Abghari (2007) and Hillman (2007) on the
political system in the Islamic regime, Bose (2010) on the evolution of the Indian con-
stitution, and Young (2015) on the early Germanic governance from circa 50 BC to
50 AD. However, there is not any research in the current economics literature using
this bipolar political bargaining model to explain the division of powers in the socialist
regimes. The rest of this paper will address this context.
2.2.3 The Party Chief and Mayor Template
Similar to the king and council template, each member’s respective ideal point
yields the highest utility in the party chief and mayor template. Again, the distance
from his ideal point is assumed to characterize his rank of orders of alternative poli-
cies: the further a point is away from his ideal point, the less utility he will have. The
points on the same circle (indifference curve) thus yield the same utility to the official.
Without losing generality, let us assume that there are seven officials in this commit-
tee, roughly divided into two groups.7 Graphically, as shown in Figure 2.2, Point P
represents the party chief and his ideal policy combination, and Point M represents the
mayor and his ideal policy combination. These two are surrounded by a group of com-
mittee members, A, B, C, D, and E, who have their own ideal policy combinations, A,
B, C, D, and E, respectively. Since the party chief has relatively more political power
in general, I assign three out of the remaining five committee members’ ideal points
to be closer to his and the other two have closer preferences to that of the mayor’s.
Both the party chief and the mayor have the agenda control and veto power, and
most decisions need to be made by bargaining and negotiation. Suppose that the
party chief proposes his ideal policy combination, P, which is far away from that of
the mayor’s, M. Thus, the Mayor can just reject Point P and propose Point M. With
some compromises, the party chief might propose Point 1 and Point 2, which are
indifferent to himself. The mayor will vote for Point 1 rather than Point 2, since
the former one is closer to his ideal point, Point M. Or, if the proposal is between
Point 2 and Point 3, then the mayor will vote for Point 3, doing a favor for the party
chief to garner future support, given the mayor’s indifference between the two policy
combinations. In the end, a steady state of the bargaining between the two leaders
7Another reason for assuming seven people is that there are seven people in the Politburo Standing
Committee (PSC) of the CPC currently.
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should yield policy proposals on Line Segment PM. Such a geometry pattern under
the majoritarian voting system is also identified by Buchanan (1998). Although only
two leaders have comparable political power, this majoritarian rule also holds. In the
end, the “votes” documented and reported to the upper level party organization and
government should indicate a “unanimous consent.”
As explained above, committee members are also endowed with weak agenda con-
trol and veto power in principle, while in most situations they can only advise rather
than decide. Take member A as an example. Rather than suggesting or proposing
his ideal policy combination, Point A, member A knows that it will never get ap-
proved. Instead, he knows that his ideal policy combination is closer to that of the
party chief’s, Point P, than that of the mayor’s, Point M. Meanwhile, Point 3 is the
closest of Points 1, 2, and 3 to Point A. Member A will “vote” for Point 3 when there
is a vote between Point 3 and Point 1, or Point 3 and Point 2, because this will result
in relatively higher utility for him (by yielding a policy combination closer to Point
A) and also has a higher probability of being approved. It is by coincidence that in
this situation Point 3 yields the highest utility to member A among all three policy
combinations.
In some situations, a normal committee member needs to sacrifice his personal
interests to get a “less worse” policy combination.8 Take member B as an example,
whose most preferred combination of Points 1, 2, and 3 is at Point 2. However, he
knows that neither of the two key leaders will vote for Point 2. Thus, he will propose
Point 3 and/or vote for Point 3 when it is proposed by either of the two leaders. The
steady state is that most of the policy proposals are on Segment PM (there could be
a few outliers), and most of the bargaining results fall on the subset of Segment PM
closer to the key leader with more political power.9
Congleton (2001, 2011) distinguishes the two situations where the king has rational
expectations or not. In the party chief and mayor template, a realistic assumption is
that all members do not have perfectly rational expectations. In other words, all of
8Csanadi (1997) provides an excellent overview of the complicated relationship net between the
various officials in party and government sectors both horizontally and vertically. Different committee
positions do matter. However, all of them have lower power than the party chief and the mayor.
Although the context in Csanadi (1997) is Hungarian, it is general for all the socialist nations,
including China.
9Though in most cases the party chief has more political power, the mayor might have more power
if he has a stronger “political background” and political resources in some rare cases.
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them are rationally ignorant to some extent. This is especially true in a socialist
regime, where the planners do not have all the knowledge or information they desire
(Hayek, 1945; Kornai, 1992). That is also why the leaders need a group of committee
members to consult.
The party chief and mayor template applies not only to policy bargaining, but also
to position appointments, even political and personal relationships. On the one hand,
both the party chief and the mayor want to place officials with professional knowledge
into committee positions. On the other hand, both the party chief and the mayor want
to nominate their respective confidants or those with closer policy preferences. The
voting result for major issues after the bargaining will be reported to the upper level
party and government organizations for official approval.
Again, as Figure 2.2 shows, suppose that there are seven officials in the committee,
including both of the key leaders. The respective distances from P and M to the
member (A, B, C, D, and E) represent the political and personal relationships between
the person and the party chief and the mayor, respectively. The further a person is
away from P or M, the less close of a relationship he has with the party chief or the
mayor, respectively. The members on the same circle (indifference curve) of the party
chief or the mayor have similarly close relationships to the party chief or the mayor.
These relationship nets do matter, especially in a regime without the rule of law. If
there is a promotion opportunity for only one out of the five committee members, who
are the party chief and the mayor going to vote for? The mayor prefers member E the
most, while the party chief prefers member C the most. The “opinions” from the peers
also matter. Members A and B will vote for C if they know that the party chief will
nominate member C, because they want to please the party chief who will give them
more favorable treatment in the future. Another reason is that C is within their small
political group led by the party chief. Member D will vote for member E if he knows
that the mayor will nominate member E. Partisanship also matters in this instance.
In the end, C will be the winner out of the five normal committee members, and the
party chief and the other members in the party chief group will also benefit from the
success of their “buddy.”
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2.3 Collective Decision Probability Function
2.3.1 Exogenous Policy
This section presents a mathematical form of the probability for approval of the
policy when voting under the party chief and mayor template. Using the same no-
tations, P represents the party chief and his most ideal policy combination, and M
represents the mayor and his most ideal policy combination. They are the only two
members who have veto power, and their powers are not exactly the same but compa-
rable. In most cases, the next step of their political path for the one with less power is
to become the one with more power within the same branch or in a neighboring one,
which is called the “Z-shape” path (Kornai, 1992). For example, a typical promotion
for a city mayor is to be the party chief of the same city or a neighboring city, the
decision of which is made by the department of organization in the upper level party
organization.
Meanwhile, although committee members in different positions have the same level
of relative power, they also have different absolute ones: the department of organization
chief has more power than someone in charge of forestry. However, assuming these
committee members have the same level of political power is a well-balanced trade-
off between taking both the rich reality and the simplicity of mathematical modeling
into consideration. In short, the other N committee members also have some limited
political power.
In principle, a decision made needs a majoritarian consensus, e.g. two thirds. How-
ever, there is one strong but very realistic assumption: if both the party chief and the
mayor reach a consensual decision, most of the rest members in the committees will
also “agree” with their decision. Although the party chief and the mayor are not the
order-givers from the top (Kornai, 1992), they are the two main officials receiving the
orders from upper apparatuses and assigning them to the other normal committee
members within that branch. In other words, they are the “media” or “order redistrib-
utors” between their branch and the upper ones. Normal committee members know
that the two leaders have supreme power, and nobody wants to play against either or
both of the two bosses unless they have support from one of the two.
Therefore, the probability function of the collective approval decision on an exoge-
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nous Policy j can be written as:






Pr(Vj = 1) is the probability that Policy j will be approved. Vpj is a binary dummy
variable indicating the vote of the party chief on Policy j: 1 means yes and 0 means no.
Similarly, Vmj is that for the mayor on Policy j, and Vnj is that for committee member
n on Policy j. Since both the party chief and the mayor have the absolute veto power,
the policy will only be approved when both of them vote yes. Thus, Pr(Vpj = 1) is
the probability that the party chief votes a yes on Policy j, and Pr(Vmj = 1) is the
probability that the mayor votes a yes on Policy j. Similarly,






Although majoritarian consent is necessary, as explained in the context above, it













N | Vpj = 0&Vmj = 0) = 1 (2.4)
However, if the party chief has more power, it is also reasonable to assume (the













N | Vpj = 0&Vmj = 1) = β, where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 (2.6)
where β is between 0 and 1, indicating the probability of the party chief’s decision
being supported and passed, even when the mayor is against it. A larger β represents
higher probability, indicating the party chief’s relative power and support from most
committee members. When β = 1, the party chief’s preference can be satisfied, re-
gardless of the mayor’s. However, when β = 0, the party chief has no more power
than the mayor. Taking the graphic model in this paper as an example, there are
five normal committee members, three closer to the party chief and two closer to the
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, thus the “Strong Independent Decision Assumption” is not
guaranteed to hold. However, a potential swing member originally closer to the mayor
might support the party chief instead in some cases, where the “Strong Independent
Decision Assumption” might hold. In this situation, 0 < β < 1. The Independent
Decision Assumptions for the two key officials actually indicate the “soft ‘political’
constraint,” which is similar to the “soft budget constraint” (Kornai, 1979, 1980, 1986)
for state-owned enterprises.
Both the party chief and the mayor are “utility” (or “rent”) maximizers. If the
group voting outcome is the same as what the party chief or the mayor votes for, then
he can enjoy one unit of “utility” or “rent” because that is what he desires. If the voting
outcome is different from what he votes for, he will have zero units of rent or utility
because this is not what he desires. Note that in this binary set up, zero represents a
“no” vote. This is not the same as keeping the status quo, leaving the issue unsolved,
which also yields zero utility to both parties. Thus, the party chief’s expected utility
on Policy j is:
EUpj = 1× Pr(Vj = 1 | Vpj = 1)× Pr(Vpj = 1) + 1× Pr(Vj = 0 | Vpj = 0)× Pr(Vpj = 0)
+0× Pr(Vj = 1 | Vpj = 0)× Pr(Vpj = 0) + 0× Pr(Vj = 0 | Vpj = 1)× Pr(Vpj = 1)
(2.7)
Similarly, the mayor’s expected rent on Policy j is:
EUmj = 1× Pr(Vj = 1 | Vmj = 1)× Pr(Vmj = 1) + 1× Pr(Vj = 0 | Vmj = 0)× Pr(Vmj = 0)
+0× Pr(Vj = 1 | Vmj = 0)× Pr(Vmj = 0) + 0× Pr(Vj = 0 | Vmj = 1)× Pr(Vmj = 1)
(2.8)
Considering both the Weak and Strong Independent Decision Assumptions, the
probabilities of an exogenous Policy j being approved or rejected conditional on the
party chief’s vote are:
Pr(Vj = 1 | Vpj = 1) = Pr(Vmj = 1) + β[1− Pr(Vmj = 1)] (2.9)
Pr(Vj = 0 | Vpj = 0) = Pr(Vmj = 0) + β[1− Pr(Vmj = 0)] (2.10)
while those for the mayor are:
Pr(Vj = 1 | Vmj = 1) = Pr(Vpj = 1) (2.11)
Pr(Vj = 0 | Vmj = 0) = Pr(Vpj = 0) (2.12)
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Thus, the expected utilities of the party chief and the mayor on Policy j are:
EUpj = 1× Pr(Vpj = 1)× [Pr(Vmj = 1) + β(1− Pr(Vmj = 1))]
+1× Pr(Vpj = 0)× [Pr(Vmj = 0) + β(1− Pr(Vmj = 0))]
(2.13)
EUmj = 1× Pr(Vpj = 1)× Pr(Vmj = 1) + 1× Pr(Vpj = 0)× Pr(Vmj = 0) (2.14)
Meanwhile:
Pr(Vpj = 1) + Pr(Vpj = 0) = 1 (2.15)
Pr(Vmj = 1) + Pr(Vmj = 0) = 1 (2.16)
Thus, Equations (2.13) and (2.14) can be rewritten as:
EUpj = (2− 2β)× Pr(Vmj = 1)× Pr(Vpj = 1) + (β − 1)× Pr(Vmj = 1)
+(β − 1)× Pr(Vpj = 1) + 1
(2.17)
EUmj = 2Pr(Vmj = 1)× Pr(Vpj = 1)− Pr(Vmj = 1)− Pr(Vpj = 1) + 1 (2.18)
For the two utility/rent maximizers, the first order conditions are:
∂EUpj
∂Pr(Vpj = 1)
= (2− 2β)× Pr(Vmj = 1) + (β − 1) = 0 (2.19)
∂EUmj
∂Pr(Vmj = 1)
= 2Pr(Vpj = 1)− 1 = 0 (2.20)
Solving Equations (2.19) and (2.20), we have:








Similarly, another variable, γ (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1), can be further added into the model,
indicating the mayor’s relative power. The solutions are the same. Actually, β and γ
can be used as the measurements of the relative weights of the two key officials. When
“β” or “γ” is non-zero, it means that the other party loses the absolute veto power
but still keeps some power. When “β” or “γ” is 1, the other party loses all the veto
power. However, 0 ≤ β + γ ≤ 1 must hold, since one issue can only be solved (either
yes or no) or unsolved (status quo), while the total probability of being solved cannot
be greater than 1. In other words, if β > 0.5, then γ < 0.5 must hold. A relatively
strong party chief must correspond with a relatively weak mayor.
This quantitative solution indicates that in order to maximize their respective
utility/rent, the best response for both the party chief and the mayor is not always
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agreeing on a decision at the same time, nor always rejecting a proposal at the same
time. One of the two key leaders’ probability of voting yes or no is independent of the
other’s. In reality, they might cooperate or bargain with each other, while this result
shows how the “checks and balances” work in the party chief and mayor template.
2.3.2 Endogenous Policy
In the former discussion, there is a strong assumption that Policy j is exogenous.
However, in many situations, the party chief and/or the mayor have endogenous pref-
erences, especially for policies closely related to their personal interests, including but
not limited to political, economic, and ideological preferences.
Suppose there is a new policy proposal i which is endogenous for the party chief;
and there is another policy proposal k, which is endogenous for the mayor. Take Policy
k as an example. Since k is endogenous for the mayor, he will stick with his endogenous
preference, regardless of what the party chief votes. However, Policy k may or may not
be consistent with the preference of the party chief. As shown in Figure 2.3, there is a
non-zero probability a (0 < a < 1) that the endogenous preference, thus the decision
of the mayor, is the same as the party chief’s preference. Thus, “collude (support the
other party’s decision)” should be the dominating strategy for the party chief; in other
words, UPk1(= 1) > UPk2.
However, there is still a non-zero probability 1− a that the mayor’s decision con-
tradicts the preference of the party chief. Similarly, the party chief faces two options:
“collude” with the mayor or not. If the party chief colludes (with a probability p,
where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1), then the outcome is actually not consistent with his preference,
thus his utility is UPk3 = 0 (as defined in the former subsection); if he does not (with
a probability 1− p), it is still possible that he gets the support of most of the normal
committee members, with a probability β (0 ≤ β ≤ 1, as defined in Section 2.3.1).
Thus UPk4 = β. Note that a is decided by nature (since the party chief and mayor are
appointed by the upper level party and government), while p is a probability choice
as a mixed strategy of the party chief.
Figure 2.4 displays the decision tree faced by the mayor, where Policy i is endoge-
nous for the party chief. The party chief will stick with his endogenous preference,
and b (0 < b < 1) is the probability that the mayor’s preference is the same as that of
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the party chief’s, which is decided by nature. Again, m is the probability the mayor
chooses, as a mixed strategy. Similarly, Umi1(= 1) > Umi2: colluding with the party
chief is a dominating strategy when they have the same preferences. When the mayor’s
preference contradicts that of the party chief, if the mayor colludes, then, his utility
Umi3 = 0. If the mayor decides not to collude, it is still possible that he can win, with
a probability γ. Because when one party decides to not collude, voting no is a weakly
dominating strategy (yielding a non-zero expected utility) compared to doing nothing
(yielding a zero expected utility). Therefore, in this scenario, β + γ = 1. β and γ
can be influenced by many exogenous and endogenous variables, e.g. their political
background, personality, etc. Meanwhile, the political bargaining between the party
chief and the mayor is also a repeated game in reality, which also shapes the results of
β and γ, while it is outside the scope of this research.
Thus, the expected utilities of the party chief and the mayor on Policies i and k
are:
EUp = EUpj + EUpk = [b+ (1− b)m+ (1− b)(1−m)β]
+[a+ (1− a)p× 0 + (1− a)(1− p)β]
(2.23)
EUm = EUmj + EUmk = [b+ (1− b)m× 0 + (1− b)(1−m)γ]
+[a+ (1− a)p+ (1− a)(1− p)γ]
(2.24)
Simplifying Equations (2.23) and (2.24) and taking partial derivatives of their
utility function with respect to their own mixed strategy variable give:
∂EUp
∂p
= (a− 1)β ≤ 0 (′′=′′ holds only when β = 0) (2.25)
∂EUm
∂m
= (b− 1)γ ≤ 0 (′′=′′ holds only when γ = 0) (2.26)
Equation (2.25) indicates that the party chief will maximize his own utility when
p takes the minimum value available, 0. This suggests that the party chief will always
play against the mayor when the mayor’s endogenous preference/policy is not the same
as his own. Equation (2.26) has a similar implication for the mayor. In conclusion,
even when the policies are endogenous, the horizontal “checks and balances” are still
in effect in the party chief and mayor template.
Yang Zhou Chapter 2. Party Chief and Mayor Template 46
2.4 Political Institutions
2.4.1 Institutional Constraints Added
In the king and council template literature, institutions have been heavily dis-
cussed, but they have never been explicitly incorporated into the graphic analysis.
Institutional constraints might restrict potential policy combinations that the two key
officials propose. Meanwhile, some normal committee members’ ideal points might
also be out of the institutional constraints. This may influence the outcome marginally
(and possibly dramatically) in some situations. Typical constraints include the con-
stitution, ideology, etc. This section illustrates the role institutional constraints play
in the party chief and mayor template.
As Figure 2.5 shows, there is an institutional constraint (the red shaded ellipse)
imposed by the upper level party, government organizations, or the constitution. As
explained before, in reality, both the party chief and the mayor are “appointed” by
upper level party and government organizations, therefore they have to obey such a
constraint in order to maintain the “legitimate” status of their positions. If he dares
to cross the constraint, he might be punished by the upper level party organizations,
including loss of both his current position and the potential of a future political career
(Kornai, 1992).
For example, the institutional constraint of the red ellipse part can represent ide-
ology. Any policy combination outside the ellipse may be viewed as deviating from
the “socialist ideology.” For example, a reasonable or politically correct combination of
policies should maintain a good balance between the central planning and the market
system. On the one hand, in order to push economic development forward, the offi-
cials may want the private sector to play a more important role; on the other hand,
due to ideological constraints, they need to maintain the relative share of state owned
enterprises. Member E might have a relatively pro market policy preference and would
propose policy combination E. In such a situation he would be viewed as an outlier.
Such a system of ideology balance or mixture is reviewed in the Constitution. As the
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (the 1982 document, amended in 2018)
Article 11 states:
“The non-public sectors of the economy such as the individual and pri-
vate sectors of the economy, operating within the limits prescribed by law,
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constitute an important component of the socialist market economy.
The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the non-public sectors
of the economy such as the individual and private sectors of the econ-
omy. The State encourages, supports and guides the development of the
non-public sectors of the economy and, in accordance with law, exercises
supervision and control over the non-public sectors of the economy.”
Figure 2.6 gives another similar situation, where policy combination 2 is not tolera-
ble by the party’s ideology. Here, member B is viewed as an outlier and his suggestions
will never be taken by his fellows. Meanwhile, neither the party chief nor the mayor
may dare to propose or approve policy combination 2, since it is outside the ideology
constraint.
2.4.2 Ideological Education, Personality Cult, and Political Move-
ments
These formal and informal institutions play an essential role in socialist politics. As
a result, using different approaches to impose ideological or constitutional constraints,
or even to shape the officials’ inherent policy preferences, are widely observed. For
example, Party Schools of the Communist Party of China are established on vari-
ous levels across the country, where working party members get ideology education.
Such systems and institutions across socialist countries are also documented in Kornai
(1992).
Meanwhile, a personality cult can help the party chief and the mayor to attract
more confidants. Combined with political movements, top figures may manage to
build up the personality cult and even gradually shift institutional constraints. In the
early years of the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong managed to build up the
personality cult of his through rounds of political movements since the late 1920s to
the middle 1940s. His political power reached the first peak of his lifetime during the
Yan’an Rectification Movement in early 1940s (Gao, 2000). Rome was not built in one
day, nor was a personality cult. Such a gradual gain of political power through political
movements has also been observed in the history of the early years of the former Soviet
Union and other socialist regimes. Another famous political movement is the Cultural
Revolution under Mao from 1966 to 1976. However, the aftermath of the Cultural
Revolution effectively discredited the red ideology movement, and the ruling elites of
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the Party realized that policies focusing on economic development should be primary.
The Communist Party of China, which rarely admits its mistakes, even concluded
that “...the ‘Cultural Revolution’ has made the party, the state and the people suffer
the most serious setbacks and losses since the founding of this country...” (Communist
Party of China (CPC), 1981).10 Even recently, gradually obtaining political power via
political movements is still seen in the political bargaining among upper-level Chinese
politicians. For example, Bo Xilai, the former party chief of Chongqing Municipality
from 2007 to early 2012, employed ideology movements and legal intervention to gain
more political power and better reputation (Zhou, 2018). The Anti-corruption Cam-
paign under Xi Jinping since late 2012 is another example. It is believed that one
main aim of this campaign is to “reduce elder influence” - extinguishing the vestiges of
influence from former paramount leader Jiang Zemin (Liu, 2015). 11
2.5 Conclusion
Kornai’s pioneering scholarship on the “soft budget constraint” (Kornai, 1979, 1980,
1986), transitions (Kornai, 1990, 2000, 2006), and the overall economic system (Kornai,
1992) described the mechanisms of socialist systems. In this paper, I build on Kornai’s
work on socialist systems by analyzing horizontal bargaining between the party chief
and the mayor in contemporary China. Specifically, I synthesize both the “no outside
checks and balances” (Kornai, 1992) and “vertical bargaining” (Kornai, 1986, 1992)
models into my analysis of this bipolar division of power within every party branch,
the cell constituting the whole socialist pyramid.
Using the contemporary socialist political system in China for context, this paper
extends the original king and council template, where political bargaining occurs be-
tween one person and a group of people, to the party chief and mayor template, where
political bargaining occurs between two key leaders with confidants. The party chief
10Resolution on Several Historical Questions for the Party since the Founding of the People’s Repub-
lic of China, 1981, the Communist Party of China (CPC). Source: the database of the Central Com-
mittees of CPC. http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64563/65374/4526448.html
(accessed May 15, 2018).
11Bo’s fall is nominally accused of his corruption (in 2013, Chinese authorities charged Bo with
bribery, abuse of power, and corruption), but is not a direct result of the Anti-corruption Campaign
by Xi which started after Bo’s fall. Moreover, Bo’s fall is the aftermath of losing the “game of thrones”
- the 2012 “election” of the 18th National Congress of the CPC, though the winner of which was Xi
Jinping (supported by other political forces on the top). Zhou (2018) gives a very detailed study of
Bo Xilai’s performances in Chongqing and the economic outcomes.
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and mayor template also incorporates institutional constraints, which influence pro-
posals and votes both directly and indirectly. Meanwhile, with the collective decision
probability function defined, the solution indicates that “checks and balances” work
between the party chief and the mayor, regardless of whether their preferences of the
policy are exogenous or endogenous.
This research pushes forward theory in the socialist system and the bipolar political
bargaining literature. The party chief and mayor template provides another way of
studying political bargaining, and the illustration in this paper shall provide more
evidence of how the contemporary politics in socialist China operates. In reality,
the party chief and the mayor may cooperate or bargain with each other in a repeated
game. More work is necessary to further reveal the economic and political mechanisms
in socialist regimes from a positive perspective, à la János Kornai’s work, rather than
leaving them unexplored.
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Chapter 3
Economic Institutions and Horizontal
“Checks and Balances” in Chinese
Bureaucratic System: Prefecture City
Level Evidence
3.1 Introduction
Principal-agent problem is widely observed in political systems, which often leads
the principals to make a loyalty-competence trade-off (Glazer, 2002; Egorov and Sonin,
2011; Zakharov, 2016; Bai and Zhou, 2019). Political leaders would like to appoint
competent agents, while they also need to secure the loyalty of agents, regardless of
whether the regime is a democracy or a dictatorship. Among the many, contemporary
Chinese system is one interesting case. To the academic, Chinese political system
is still a “black box” for the most part. One common view of the Chinese political
system is that there is no de facto democracy. Indeed, the appointment process of
officials is full of manipulation, and that of the party and government officials is more
autocratic than that of the congressional process. However, the Communist Party
of China and the Constitution assert their right to practice “Democratic Centralism”
from the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (the 1982 document, amended
in 2018), which enables the upper-level party and government officials to bargain and
appoint the officials in the lower-level sectors and thus construct the political pyramid
in this Socialist regime.
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The median voter theorem suggests that politicians are elected by the median voter.
In the Chinese context, politicians are appointed, i.e. “elected”, by the upper-level ones,
through political bargaining. Now that the mid-level bureaucrats are agents of their
upper-level officials and personnel appointment procedure has been institutionalized
as through the Party’s Organization Department on various levels, no single official
can manage to place his/her confidants in all the positions. In the earlier years of this
Socialist regime, waves of political movements were employed to purge political enemies
and to enhance the loyalty of officials to Mao (Gao, 2000; Bai and Zhou, 2019). In the
last three decades, political movements still occur but are very rare. Two exceptions are
Bo Xilai’s red ideology and legal intervention movements in Chongqing Municipality
(Zhou, 2018) and the recent Anti-Corruption Campaign by Xi Jinping (Zhou, 2020).
However, for most part of the last three decades, the bureaucratic system has been
running smoothly.
The literature of contemporary Chinese politician promotions and appointments
focuses on the effects of economic performance (competence) and political connections
(loyalty) of the officials, regardless of the level it is studying: central level (Shih et al.,
2012; Bai and Zhou, 2019), province level (Bo, 1996; Maskin et al., 2000; Li and Zhou,
2005; Jia et al., 2015), prefecture city level (Yao and Zhang, 2015), and county level
(Chen and Zhu, 2018). However, the connection or relationship investigated is mainly
inter-level, while there is little research studying the intra-level political bargaining
and competition. Zhou (2020) investigates political bargaining within every cell of
the Chinese political system, and he argues that horizontal “checks and balances” in
local governments are enhanced due to the vertical political bargaining across levels
and the horizontal political bargaining within the upper-level government. On the
one hand, upper-level government officials want their agents to be cooperative, which
enhances the governing efficiency. On the other hand, they would like to see some
inner fights among their agents so that the lower-level officials will trade obedience to
the senior ones for support from them, by which “loyalty” is enhanced. Zhou (2020)
also highlights that institutions affect the personnel appointment process, while it has
never been empirically examined in the literature.
Therefore, in this paper, it empirically investigates the relationship between eco-
nomic institutions and personnel appointments in Chinese political system. Although
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the political system is the same in this one-party state, economic institutions vary
across regions. More specifically, with the data available, it tests whether provin-
cial level economic freedom influences the differences between party chief and mayor
appointed on the prefecture city level from 2000 to 2009, who are the de facto most
powerful leaders in every city government. In other words, this paper does not directly
study the loyalty of any specific official to their principal (if there is), while it studies
how institutions influence the horizontal “checks and balances” (approximated by their
“mismatch”) among local leaders.
Results from a fixed effects model suggest that more economic freedom in one
province reduces the difference of basic biographical background (composed of gender,
race, age, geographical origin, and education level) and career experience (whether
they served in military, youth league, or as an assistant or secretary to a senior offi-
cial) between party chief and mayor. However, more economic freedom in one province
increases the difference of ideology component (measured by the major of education,
economist or not, engineer or not, and whether the degree is from a party school) be-
tween party chief and mayor. It suggests that in regions with more economic freedom,
the city leaders appointed are more “matched” regarding their biographical background
and career experience, which may help enhance their cooperation and thus efficiency.
However, in provinces with more economic freedom, the city leaders appointed are more
“mismatched” regarding their ideology component, which suggests that the upper-level
government may prefer more “checks and balances” of their ideological preferences. An
Instrumental Variable (IV) approach and robustness tests using ordered probit model
and lagged effects all suggest comparable results.
This research contributes to the current literature in several ways. First, it is the
first paper empirically studying how the province level economic institutions influence
the party organization’s decision on appointing prefecture city leaders. Second, it
unveils how economic institutions influence the “match” between local political leaders,
which further affects their loyalty to the upper-level government. The results deepen
understanding of institutions’ role in deciding cadre appointments and the loyalty-
competence trade-off in contemporary China, the analysis of which is missing in the
current literature.
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3.2 Cadre Evaluation and Appointment in Contem-
porary China
The political appointment process in China is normally viewed as a “black box”, and
the contemporary literature mainly focuses on the inter-level relations and promotions
of officials. Indeed, the early years of this Socialist regime, especially the Cultural
Revolution, witnessed the chaotic era when political fights could take many forms
including political movements with purging. For example, Bai and Zhou (2019) study
the Communist Party of China Central Committee members from 1945 to 1982 to
investigate the loyalty-competence trade-off made by Mao.1 They find that purging
the capable young subordinates was more likely during the Cultural Revolution (1966-
1976), who had more outside options and thus expended less effort on loyalty.
However, in the last three decades, the form of political fights and bargaining within
the Communist Party has been more “peaceful”. To most mid-level cadres, “game of
thrones” on the top is not directly related to them. They are just parts of the bu-
reaucratic machine, while they might be uniformly affected under political movements.
Therefore, in the stable institutionalized political system, mid-level officials can only
employ “peaceful” and “institutionalized” means to achieve their ends. If they want
to place any confidants of theirs in a specific position to be filled, they have to run it
through the Organization Department of the Party. Even though it might be just pro
forma in some cases, a “voting” procedure by the mass or by the standing committee
on the corresponding level is necessary. For example, popular election on the village
level has been nationally institutionalized in 1998. In some cases, these elections are
just pro forma. In other cases, these elections can be competitive and thus are used
to replace the incumbents, which also further enhances local governance (Han, 2014).
Meanwhile, officials (principals and agents) move frequently in the current bureau-
cratic system, which makes it difficult to secure the loyalty of relative agents. Instead
of maintaining the loyalty from any specific person, principals continuously work on
maintaining the dynamic equilibrium among their agents.
The current cadre evaluation system nominally states that it accounts for the eco-
nomic performance of the cadres’ ruling. The literature provides supporting evidence
of the essential effect of economic performance on officials’ promotion in general, while
1Mao already seized the supreme power by 1945 (Gao, 2000), and he passed away in 1976.
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there is also some evidence against it. Bo (1996) finds that the economic performance
of province leaders in China help their promotion, with the observations from 1949 to
1994. Maskin et al. (2000) observe the province level economic growth in 1976 and
1986 and further investigate the relative political power of a province in 1977 and 1987,
respectively. They find that the promotion opportunity of a province’s leaders (mea-
sured as the provincial per capita number of Central Committee members in the Party
Congress) is positively correlated with the ranking of the province’s economic growth.
Li and Zhou (2005) study the province level political turnovers from 1979 to 1995 in
China, and they also find that the likelihood of promotion is positively correlated with
the economic performances of the officials. Moreover, the average performance over
their tenure plays a more essential role than their annual performance.
More recently, Shih et al. (2012) study the advancement of Central Committee
members of the Communist Party of China, and they find no evidence that strong
economic growth helps promotion. Instead, factional ties with various top leaders,
educational qualifications, and provincial revenue collection play substantial roles in
elite ranking. Jia et al. (2015) focus on provincial leaders who are in the pool for
top political offices on the national level, and they find that both the economic perfor-
mances and political connections to the top of province leaders affect their promotions.
Moreover, performances and connections are complements in the Chinese political se-
lection process, and they argue that “connections foster loyalty of junior officials to
senior ones, thereby allowing incumbent top politicians to select competent provincial
leaders without risking being ousted” (Jia et al., 2015).
Yao and Zhang (2015) use the decomposition method to study the Chinese city
leaders (party chief and mayor) from 1994 to 2010, with a unique city-leader linked
dataset developed by themselves. They find that these leaders have significantly dif-
ferent levels of abilities to promote the local economy. They also find that the personal
abilities have more important roles in leaders’ promotions, and it is most important
around the median age (around 50) in the sample. Following that, Xi et al. (2018) fur-
ther study the political business cycles in China. They find that different city leaders
have different capacities (“leader effects”) as found in Yao and Zhang (2015), and they
further find that more competent leaders are less likely to take opportunistic actions
before the Communist Party’s nation congress which holds every five years. Their
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findings suggest that the Chinese political selections are associated with the long-term
reputation of officials, which further provides supportive evidence for the reputation
model of political business cycles in the Chinese context.
Jiang (2018) focuses on the economic performances of a prefecture city after a new
party chief or mayor is appointed and finds evidence that there is actually a “patron-
client” relationship between the province party chief and governor and the city level
party chiefs and mayors. The GDP of a city with a newly appointed city party chief or
mayor grows significantly faster than the other cities, two years after the appointment
as a “payment” back to the promotion made by the province leaders, as long as the
province leaders are still holding their tenures.
Chen and Zhu (2018) study the leaders (party chief and mayor) of the county level
regions in China from 2000 to 2011. They also find that better economic performance,
measured by the ranking of the county in the prefecture city, significantly increases
the officials’ likelihood of getting promoted. Meanwhile, if the economic performance
of the county is ranked among the top five (a typical prefecture city has about 7-9
county-level regions), the officials are also more likely to get promoted.
One important question that remains open in the current literature is how the
politicians on the same level- more specifically, within the same government unit- bar-
gain with each other. In other words, are there institutionalized “checks and balances”
with design in this socialist regime, like those in the Western countries (Congleton
and Zhou, 2019)? If there are, could that induce the upper-level officials to place
“mismatched” officials as city party chief and mayors? Yao and Zhang (2015) suggest
that the party chief and the mayor are co-workers and thus jointly contribute to the
economic growth, while they do not investigate the competitions between the two local
leaders.
Zhou (2020) starts theoretically investigating the horizontal “checks and balances”
between party chief and mayor, the top two leaders on various levels. He argues that
the horizontal “checks and balances” are reinforced by vertical bargaining between up-
per level governments and lower level ones. The development of local economies in
China under the regionally decentralized authoritarian system after the Reform and
Opening-up in 1978 has helped local governments to gain more fiscal and political
power (Qian and Roland, 1998; Xu, 2015). On the one hand, the upper level gov-
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ernments want the party chief and the mayor in lower levels to get along well, the
cooperation of whom can help increase governance efficiency. On the other hand, in
order to have more controls over the leaders in lower level governments and avoid the
lower jurisdictions being run by factions, the upper level governments may deliber-
ately exaggerate the differences between the two lower-level leaders. For example, if
the party chief and the mayor are not “matched” well, they will “collude” less and make
more efforts to please the officials in upper level governments to attain more favorable
treatment, political support, and possible promotions. Meanwhile, many lower-level
officials are representatives of the upper-level ones’ interests, and it is a “patron-client”
relationship as indicated by Jiang (2018).
Zhou (2020) further suggests that institutions limit the policy space and influence
the appointment and promotion of officials. More specifically regarding the research
question this paper is trying to answer, when province level government officials are ap-
pointing the prefecture city party chiefs and mayors, the senior officials take the “checks
and balances” between the (relatively) junior officials into consideration. Whether it
is a “principle-agent” relationship or a “patron-client” relationship between the provin-
cial officials and the prefecture city officials (Jiang, 2018), provincial economic institu-
tions should influence the bargaining process and appointment decisions made on the
provincial level. Unfortunately, it cannot capture the detailed bargaining and decision
process of these government officials. However, even though China is a one-party state,
the economic institutions vary across provinces, which influence not only economic ac-
tivities (Wu and Teng, 2012) but also political ones. Thus, it is feasible to capture
the variation in economic institutions between provinces and investigate whether the
economic institutions influence the decisions of designing the “checks and balances”
between prefecture city party chiefs and mayors across provinces. In other words, it
can investigate whether the economic institutions in different provinces have different
effects on the “matching” degrees designed and the role of institutional constraints. By
this, it is feasible to uncover some part of this official appointment “black box”.
There is a possible concern for reverse causation. Specifically, will prefecture city
party chiefs and mayors influence the province level institutions? On the one hand, the
nature of the top-down hierarchical system in China determines that the lower level
officials are just obeying the orders from the upper-level officials. On the other hand,
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the regionally decentralized authoritarian system also enables officials in lower level
governments to have limited autonomy. Therefore, there might be mutual interactions
and effects between the provincial and city governments. However, since province
level government has supreme power to the prefecture city level government, and
the provincial level laws and regulations dominate the outcomes in this regime, it is
reasonable to assume that the mechanism with province-to-city direction is the more
essential one, which is the focus of this paper.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
This section manages to empirically uncover the economic institutions part of the
cadre appointments “black box” in the Chinese political system. As explained in the
former section, the provincial level government leaders may deliberately increase or
decrease the differences between the city party chiefs and the mayors in the province.
It is not certain whether the “cooperation” (competence) incentive dominates, which
pushes the province leaders to appoint more similar party chiefs and mayors, or the
“checks and balances” (loyalty) incentive dominates, which pushes the province leaders
to appoint more different party chiefs and mayors.
3.3.1 Model Specification
When the city party chief and mayor have more similar backgrounds and experi-
ences, it is more likely that they cooperate well and even form a clique, which makes
the upper-level government have less de facto control. Therefore, less difference be-
tween the two leaders can be approximated as that they cooperate well and make
their branch running more effectively. Instead, more difference between the two lead-
ers suggests that there is more diversity. This diversity might bring more specialized
knowledge to the specific government unit, while it also brings more difference between
the two leaders thus makes them less likely to form a united clique.
The main model used is a fixed effects model with year fixed effects. It explains
the differences of the party chief and the mayor of prefecture city c in province p in
year t, and it is specified as
Difcpt = βEIpt + ψXpt + ρZct + δt + ucpt (3.1)
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where Difcpt stands for the difference measures of the party chief and the mayor of
city c in province p in year t. EIpt is the economic institutions (marketization in this
context, i.e. economic freedom) of province p in year t. Xpt represents the economic,
demographic, and geographic control variables for province p in year t. Zct is the logged
city GDP of city c in year t. δt is a year fixed effect, controlling for heterogeneity over
time. Last but not least, upct is the unexplained error term for the difference measures
of party chief and mayor of city c in province p in year t.
The main reason for not including province fixed effects is that the sample studied
only covers 10 years (2000-2009), which means that on average there are about three
different party chiefs and about three different mayors in every city. Although the over-
all economic freedom developed in most provinces over the time period studied, there
is strong persistence of economic freedom across regions. As Figure 3.1 shows, the
relative ranking of provinces’ economic freedom is consistent over the 10-year period.
Provinces with relatively higher economic freedom at the beginning of the 21st century
end up still having relatively higher freedom 10 years later, though the average for the
whole of China increased, too. Facing this endogeneity and sparse observations in the
sample, province fixed effects factor out too much variation. Meanwhile, even in Equa-
tion (3.1) where the province fixed effects are not included, a border dummy variable
and a minority dummy variable are included, and there are also various provincial
level economic and demographic control variables. For the provinces with the Han
race as the majority, the social norms and ruling structures are very similar. That
being said, the model in Equation (3.1) should address the concerns of heterogeneous
characteristics across provinces well.
An instrumental variable (IV) approach is also employed to further address the
potential endogenity concern for exploring the relationships between these difference
measures and economic freedom and its areas. It is not only a technique but also an art
to pick the appropriate instrumental variable. The one I employ for this research is a
“marriage index.” More specifically, the number of people who divorce and/or remarry
is related with institutions which include culture and economic freedom, especially
in China where a large number of people still see divorce and remarriage as anti-
traditional. However, it should not directly relate to the background differences of the
top two leaders in a city. The Marriage Index for province p in year t is calculated as





Where Divorcept represents the number of people who divorce in province p in year
t. Remarrypt is the number of people who marry but not for the first time in province
p in year t (they have divorced or lost spouse before). FirstMarrypt is the number of
people who marry for the first time in province p in year t, to control for the overall
marriage rates in every province.
The first stage regression of the IV approach is as
EIpt = φMarriage Indexpt + ψXpt + ρZct + δt + ucpt (3.3)
Where the control variables Xpt and Zct, year fixed effects δt, and error term ucpt
are the same as that in Equation (3.1). The second stage regression of the IV approach
with the estimated economic freedom ÊIpt (standard errors adjusted) is as
Difcpt = βÊIpt + ψXpt + ρZct + δt + ucpt (3.4)
3.3.2 Prefecture City Party Chief and Mayor Data and Differ-
ence Measures
In general, Chinese politician data are very limited. However, a recent data set
released by Chen (2016) contains the basic information of party chiefs and mayors of
prefecture cities in China. The data cover part or all observations of 334 prefecture
cities (and sub-provincial cities, autonomous prefectures, and regions) in 27 provinces.2
3 The average de facto term of party chief in the sample is 3.88 years, and that of
mayor is 3.72 years (Chen, 2016). That being said, the observations are city-year
ones, and two consecutive observations of a city may be the same for some years if
neither the party chief nor the mayor left office. Although there are general “elections”
2There are 31 province level regions in Mainland China. Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin
cities are municipalities directly controlled by the central government and are excluded in this data
set.
3In a recent paper, Jiang (2018) provides access to the Chinese Political Elite Database (CPED),
“a large biographical database that contains extensive demographic and career information of over
4,000 key city, provincial and national leaders in China since late 1990s.” The variables of Jiang
(2018) include officials’ name, gender, race, province and city born, education, year of joining the
Party, military experience or not, and working experiences. However, it does not have the specific
majors of their education, nor whether the degrees are of party school or not. It also does not have
the information of being an economist or engineer. Therefore, to include more characteristics of the
officials in my analysis, I decided to use the data of Chen (2016).
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for both the party and the government every five years, many promotions decided by
upper level governments happen between the two general “elections”.
The party chief observations in this data set are from 2000 to 2010 (3,032 obser-
vations with part or full information), and the mayors are from 2000 to 2012 (3,916
observations with part or full information). The information of the politicians is col-
lected from publicly available sources and includes: provincial code and name, city
code and name, year, year born, month born, province born, city born, gender, race,
education level (high school, college, etc.), degree from party school or not, education
major, economist or not, engineer or not, year joining the party, year starting work,
military experience or not, youth league experience or not, and assistant or secretary
to a senior official experience or not. Many party chiefs and mayors in this data set do
not have full observations for all variables. Given the current situation of Chinese po-
litical data in general, this data set is not perfect but is definitely a great contribution
to the literature of Chinese political economy. Though it is a relatively new data set,
it has been used in the literature, e.g. Lyu et al. (2018) on GDP management to meet
or beat growth targets in China and Jin et al. (2018) on inter-jurisdiction political
competition and green total factor productivity.
After dropping observations with missing values for the variables used in the study,
there are 1,786 paired party chief & mayor observations with full information left, on
the city-year level. The summary statistics of the information of party chiefs and
mayors are displayed in Table 3.1. The summary statistics of the differences between
the party chief and the mayor of the same city in the same year are displayed in
Table 3.2. More specifically, “Party_variable” and “Mayor_variable” in Table 3.1
stand for the value of the variables in the original data set for party chief and mayor,
respectively. “P&M Dif_variable” in Table 3.2 stands for the absolute value of the
difference of that variable between the party chief and the mayor of that city in that
year. The meanings of most variables are self-evident by the names, while some others
need some explanations which are provided below.
Gender is coded as 0 for male and 1 for female. As shown in Table 3.1, only 2.5%
city-year party chief observations are female, and it is slightly higher for mayors, 4.3%.
If the party chief and the mayor have different genders, then P&M Dif_Gender is
coded as 1; otherwise 0.
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Race is coded as 0 for Minorities (55 different ones in China) and 1 for Han Race.
As shown in Table 3.1, 91.9% party chiefs and 94.3% mayors are Han Race. If one
of the party chief and the mayor is Han Race and the other is a Minority, then P&M
Dif_Race is coded as 1; otherwise 0.
Age displayed in Table 3.1 is the real age, calculated by the year of observation
subtracting the year the official was born from the original data set. As Kou and
Tsai (2014) describe, there is an age dilemma in the Communist Party of China cadre
appointment system. Official limits on the age of cadres is used to address the geron-
tocracy as in earlier years (Berton and Panel, 2017). Most party chiefs and mayors of
prefecture cities are holding the “Bureau Director (zhèng t¯ıng)” rank, who have to step
down by 55 years old unless being promoted to a higher rank. “Step down” means that
they still need to work in the government as normal employees with their former rank
until the age of 60 before they can officially retire; however, they lose their de facto
position and power. For example, the party chiefs and mayors of sub-provincial cities-
typically the capital city of a province- hold the “Deputy Minister (fù bù)” rank and
must step down and retire by the age of 60 unless they are promoted to a higher rank.
Thus, the maximum age of officials in the sample is 60 years old. The official terms
for both party chief and mayor are both five years, since the general “elections” occur
every fives years. Thus, when calculating the differences of age between the party chief
and the mayor of the same city, P&M Dif_Age, I use a binary dummy variable: if the
age difference is no less than five years, then it is given value 1; otherwise 0. The main
reason is that if the two figures have a large age difference, they are not at the same
point in their political career, given the age dilemma for cadres in China.4 Xi et al.
(2018) also highlight the political business cycles in the Chinese political system, and
passing some specific ages (57 studied in Xi et al. (2018)) changes officials’ incentives
thus actions. Meanwhile, using this binary coding method helps address the “inflation”
issue of age, since all other measures are coded as 1-0 binary variables and the large age
differences constituting the difference scores as dependent variables would otherwise
overweight age.5
4There is also an idiom in China: there is already a generation gap between people with a three
year age difference. However, five years is used as the cutoff, which is the official term. Age differences
coded as the absolute differences divided by 5 also yield comparable results.
5Chen (2016) also includes the year the officials started working and the year they joined the
Communist Party of China. However, since age is already included and they are already either
prefecture city party chief or mayor, those two measures shall not play a direct nor important role in
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The city of an official’s birth place is also included in the data set. In Chinese
culture, if two officials are from the same region, it is likely that they will form a clique
because of their common hometown. As a result of this, most city party chiefs and
mayors work in a different city other than the city they were born, designed by the
authoritarian system to reduce potential cronyism. Therefore, I construct a binary
variable P&M Dif_City Born, which is coded as 1 if they are from two different cities,
and 0 if they are from the same city. As shown in Table 3.2, City Born difference has
the highest mean among all the individual difference measures: 0.916, which means
that 91.6% paired party chiefs and mayors don’t share the same origin.
Education score stands for the highest degree an official has received. If it is lower
than high school, then it is coded as 0; 1 for high school; 2 for junior college; 3 for
four-year college; 4 for masters; 5 for Ph.D. When calculating the difference score
between party chief and mayor, if their degrees are different for at least 2 points which
is a “reasonable” gap, then the P&M Dif_Edu Score is coded as 1; otherwise 0. For
example, if the party chief’s highest degree is high school, while the mayor’s is college,
then the difference is coded as 0; however, if the party chief’s highest degree is high
school and the mayor’s is masters or Ph.D., then it is coded as 1. I have also conducted
different education score coding with 3 points’ difference, or just using the real point
difference instead of the binary coding method, and results are robust regardless of the
coding method. Similar to the coding philosophy for age, the main reason for using
this binary coding method is to address the “inflation” issue of the education score.
Chen (2016) also documents officials’ career history: whether they have ever served
in the military, in the youth league, or as an assistant or secretary of senior officials.
Having served in the military might shape the official’s ruling style and change the
chance of promotion. The youth league is viewed as an express way of promotion, which
can also help avoid the age dilemma (Kou and Tsai, 2014). Having been an assistant
or secretary of senior officials endows an official with a stronger political network and
more support from senior government officials in the upper level governments. To
take this into account, I constructed P&M Dif_Military, P&M Dif_Youth League,
and P&M Dif_Assistance to measure the career differences between party chief and
mayor.
the appointment decision process. My interview of several Chinese government officials also verified
this.
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In addition, it is also possible to observe the majors of officials’ degrees: humanities,
social science, natural science and technology, agriculture, or medical. The major of
higher education may also influence the way they perceive the world and the way they
handle issues. Therefore, I also construct a binary variable P&M Dif_Major, which
is 1 if there is no overlap at all between the degrees of the party chief and the mayor
(some of them have more than one post-secondary degree and therefore there is a
possibility for more than one major); as long as there is an overlapping major between
the party chief and the mayor, which means that they at least have some “common
language” regrading their higher education, then it is coded as 0.
The data set also documents whether a party chief or mayor is an economist or en-
gineer (officially certificated in the Chinese system), and both are coded as a 1-0 binary
variable. Thus, similarly, I construct the differences on these two perspectives between
party chief and mayor as 1-0 binary variables. Being certificated as an economist or an
engineer suggests that this “technocrat” has very specialized knowledge in that area,
and this specialized knowledge might influence the official’s ideology. An “economist”
might rule his jurisdiction with more economically correct policies, while an “engineer”
might rule the jurisdiction with more planning due to the potential “fatal conceit”
(Hayek, 1988).
Party Schools of the Communist Party of China are established on various levels
across the country, where working party members get ideology education. Rather
than most party members who only have occasional or regular training at various
party schools, some have more formal education and receive official degrees from party
schools which are equivalent to those from normal higher education institutions. For
the officials who receive their degree from a party school, Chen (2016) codes it as 1;
otherwise 0. Similar to the former variables in my analysis, if there is a difference
between the party school degree identifications of the party chief and the mayor, then
P&M Dif_Party School is coded as 1; otherwise 0. Getting an official degree from the
party school system means that the official has had a much more significant amount
of time learning red ideology materials by the Communist Party of China, which may
in turn influence their policies.
As Table 3.3 shows, all of the 12 difference variables are relatively independent of
each other.6 Most correlation coefficients are below 0.10, and the highest one is only
6Please refer to Table 3.2 for the “codebook” of the names of the variables. Original variable names
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0.16. Therefore, without concerns of multicollinearity of these difference variables,
I further construct three main measures of the differences between party and mayor
based on the category of these individual difference variables: (1) Basic Biography
Information, which sums the gender, race, age, city born, and education score; (2)
Career, which sums the scores of whether they have served in the military, in the youth
league, or as an assistant or secretary; (3) Ideology, which sums the degree’s major,
economist or not, engineer or not, and party school degree or not. I also construct a
Total index, which is the summation of the former three main measures. The summary
statistics of these main measures are in Table 3.2. On average, the Basic Biographical
difference measure between paired party chiefs and mayors is about 1.8 points, the
Career difference is about 1.1 points, the Ideology difference is also about 1.1 points,
and the Total difference is about 4 points. Section 3.3.5 provides an example showing
how to calculate the difference measures for paired party chief and mayor.
Figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 show the provincial level averages of their cities’ Basic
Biographical Difference, Career Difference, and Ideology Difference overtime, respec-
tively. Each panel in these figures is shown with that panel’s own scores divided into
five quantiles, which is more straight forward to compare the relative ranking changes.
Checking the range of these panels also provides inter-temporal trends of the whole of
China: it is evident that there are inter-temporal variations for all these three mea-
sures. In general, Figure 3.2 shows that the relatively more developed provinces in
the east have less Basic Biographical Difference than the central and northeastern
ones. Northwestern province regions have the most Basic Biographical Differences,
where many officials moved from other central and eastern provinces, as “assist fron-
tier cadres”. Furthermore, the relative ranking of Basic Biographical Difference also
changes overtime.
Figure 3.3 also shows evidence of the inter-temporal variations of provinces’ rank-
ings on Career Difference. The “Central Plain” and southern provinces seem to have
relatively more Career Difference than others. Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region
always has relatively high Career Difference, which is due to its political uniqueness
and the large number of “assist frontier cadres” from other provinces.
Besides a similar inter-temporal variation pattern, Figure 3.4 suggests that the rel-
atively more developed regions in the east do have more Ideology Difference as defined.
are not displayed due to a typesetting issue.
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Except those boundary and/or minority provinces, most provinces in the east do have
a relatively higher Ideology Difference. Pan and Xu (2018) find that respondents from
more developed provinces are more likely to prefer democratic institutions and support
market reforms, based on a large online survey of normal citizens. Therefore, it is pos-
sible that the ruling party deliberately imposes more difference regarding the ideology
of the party chief and mayor, to prevent potential ideologically outlying outcomes.
3.3.3 NERI Index: Province Level Economic Freedom Data
The second main data set is the Marketization of China’s Provinces: NERI Report
2011 by Fan et al. (2011), which contains China’s province level marketization index
from 1997 to 2009. “Marketization” is the synonym of “economic freedom” in the
Chinese context, while “marketization” is more politically correct and safer in China.7
The latest NERI Index report (Fan et al., 2017) covers years 2008 to 2014, but its
construction methodology is slightly different from the former one (Fan et al., 2011).
The NERI Index from the latest two reports cannot be merged. Given that the party
chief and mayor data set by Chen (2016) also only covers paired observations from
2000 to 2010, the years 2000-2009 are used as the time period in this research.
The scaling methodology of the Marketization of China’s Provinces: NERI Report
2011 takes the year of 2001 as the base year, when all the components are scaled
from 0 to 10: a higher score means that the region performs better in marketization
(economic freedom) regarding that component. The scores in the later years are using
those in 2001 as the baseline with the same methodology. However, the scores are
not normalized, leading to values of less than 0 or greater than 10 in the following
years. The 2011 Report (Fan et al., 2011) mainly studies the marketization in Chi-
nese provinces from 2007 to 2009, while it also adjusts the scores for the earlier years
reported in earlier reports and thus provides scores with consistent methodology from
1997 to 2009. The NERI Report has five main areas, comprised of 18 components
(a few of which have sub-components). The five areas are: (1) “relationship between
government and market”, the size of the government in the regional economy; (2)
“development of non-state economy (ownership structure)”, concerning the growth of
7During a conference conversation with Dr. James Gwartney, one of the coauthors of the widely
cited Economic Freedom of the World annual report (e.g. Gwartney et al. (2018)), he told me that
he actually gave advice and suggestions to the coauthors of the NERI Index along the construction
process.
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the non-state sector and provincial-level reform of state enterprises; (3) “goods market
development”, trade barriers and the regional-level price control; (4) “factors market
development”, the development of mechanisms of allocation of resources including cap-
ital and labor; and (5) “legal frameworks”, includes data on the setting-up of a legal
framework for property-rights protection and contract enforcement. The summary
statistics of province regions’ overall marketization and the five areas are reported in
Table 3.4.8
Figure 3.1 shows the temporal changes of provinces’ economic freedom. The overall
economic freedom of Chinese provinces has been improving over this 10 year window,
while the relative ranking has not changed much. The east coastal provinces relatively
have the highest economic freedom all the time, the central ones follow, and the western
and northwestern ones have the lowest.
3.3.4 Province Level and City Level Data
The provincial level economic and demographic control variables include: province
GDP, province population, province fixed capital investment (%, calculated from raw
data), province trade ratio to GDP (%, calculated from raw data), and province col-
lege employee share of total population (%, calculated from raw data). I also create
two more dummy variables for provincial regions to capture the potential ethnic or
geographic peculiarity. Minority: coded as 1 if it is an autonomous region of minority,
and 0 otherwise. Border: coded as 1 if it is neighboring another country on land, and
0 otherwise. I also include city GDP data as a control variable for the heterogeneity
of cities in China.
The provincial level data are from the National Bureau of Statistics of China.9 The
city level annual GDP data are from the Wind Data10, which is an online macroeco-
nomic data service provider (with data collected from official sources) in China. The
summary statistics are also reported in Table 3.4.
8For readers who are interested in more details about the NERI Index, Zhou and Hall (2019) give
a very detailed overview of the NERI Index, especially the detailed explanation of the components of
the five areas. Zhou and Hall (2019) explain the entrepreneurship changes in Chinese provinces using
the Marketization of China’s Provinces: NERI Report 2016 (Fan et al., 2017): although a couple of
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3.3.5 An Example of How to Calculate the Difference Measures
Take Nanjing City of Jiangsu Province as an example. Nanjing is the capital city of
Jiangsu Province (an Eastern province). During the 2000-2009 time period studied in
this paper, Nanjing has paired observations with full information from 2002 to 2009.11
During the 8 years observed, Nanjing has had three different party chiefs and three
different mayors. For example, in 2002, the party chief is Li Yuanchao, who is: male,
Han race, 52 years old, born in Huai’an City of Jiangsu Province, Ph.D., no military
experience, with youth league experience, no assistance experience, major is social
science, not an economist, not an engineer, has party school degree. The paired mayor
of Nanjing City in 2002 is Luo Zhijun, who is: male, Han race, 51 years old, born in
Chaoyang City of Liaoning Province, has a Masters degree, with military experience,
with youth league experience, with assistance experience, major is social science, is an
economist, not an engineer, not party school degree.
Therefore, the constructed P&M Dif_variables for Nanjing City in 2002 are: P&M
Dif_Gender = 0 (V1), P&M Dif_Race = 0 (V2), P&M Dif_Age = 0 (V3), P&M
Dif_City Born = 1 (V4), P&M Dif_Edu Score = 0 (V5), P&M Dif_Military = 1 (V6),
P&M Dif_Youth League = 0 (V7), P&M Dif_Assistance = 1 (V8), P&M Dif_Major
= 0 (V9), P&M Dif_Economist = 1 (V10), P&M Dif_Engineer = 0 (V11), and P&M
Dif_Party School = 1 (V12). Therefore, P&M Dif_Basic Bio = 1, P&M Dif_Career
= 2, P&M Dif_Ideology = 2, and P&M Dif_Total = 5.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Fixed Effects Model Results
The fixed effects model results from Equation (3.1) are displayed in Table 3.5. Col-
umn 1 suggests that in a province with higher economic freedom, a prefecture city’s
party chief and mayor are less different regarding their Basic Biographical character-
11An ironic excursion. In late 2013, the current mayor of Nanjing, Ji Jianye, was removed from
office and charged of corruption. In early 2015, the current party chief of Nanjing, Yang Weize, was
also removed from office and charged of corruption. One rumor is that Mayor Ji and his father in
law, Gao Dezheng who was the vice governor of Jiangsu Province, thought it was Party Chief Yang
who reported the corruption issues of Ji to the upper level government. In order to exact revenge,
Ji and Gao also reported Yang’s corruption issues to the upper level government. What a unique
case of the “checks and balances” between the party chief and the mayor. Yang Weize https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Yang_Weize. Ji Jianye https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ji_Jianye
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istics. The magnitude of effect is also reasonable: the measure of difference caused by
the difference of economic freedom can be as large as about 0.9 point (the coefficient
estimated times the difference of economic freedom, −0.095 × 9.13 = −0.87). From
another perspective, one standard deviation change of economic freedom corresponds
to about 0.2 standard deviation change of the Basic Biographical difference.
Column 2 suggests a similar negative effect on Career Experience. One explanation
is that in a province with more economic freedom the daily ruling of local governments
is likely to have more “rule of law” (more accurately, “rule by law” in China) and
less “rule of man”. The administrative procedures in a province with more economic
freedom are more normalized. Thus, the party chiefs and mayors appointed are needed
to be more “matched” to have less infighting and thus have higher ruling efficiency. It is
also “economically/politically” significant: one standard deviation change of economic
freedom corresponds to about 0.11 standard deviation change of the Career difference.
For the province with the most economic freedom and the one with the least economic
freedom, it may lead to a 0.43 point difference of the Career difference, which is about
half of its standard deviation.
However, as shown in Column 3, party chiefs and mayors are more different re-
garding the Ideology measure in provinces with higher economic freedom; one stan-
dard deviation of economic freedom corresponds to 0.14 standard deviation of the
Ideology difference. Officials in provinces with higher economic freedom are more
likely to adopt pro-free-market thoughts and policies. Zhou (2020) argues that the
authoritarian system is embedded with institutional constraints, including ideological
ones. Thus, possibly due to the ideology regulating concerns, the ideological differ-
ences between party chief and mayor are designed to be larger in provinces with higher
economic freedom. Another alternative explanation is: in a province with more eco-
nomic freedom, the provincial level appointment committee is more likely to consider
and give opportunities to officials with various backgrounds; while in a province with
less economic freedom, they still would like to appoint the officials from a pool of
officials with limited diversity. Regardless of which reason, more ideological diversity
will increase the potential “checks and balances” between party chief and mayor.
Column 4 suggests that overall economic freedom does not have a significant effect
on the total index. The total index is the summation of 12 different characteristics,
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and the effects of these characteristics with different signs counteract one another. In
short, results in Table 3.5 indicate that economic freedom influences the different main
measures of the differences of party chief and mayor, i.e. it influences the horizontal
“checks and balances” designed across provinces. However, it does not have a significant
effect on the aggregated total index.
As explained in the earlier section, the marketization index by Fan et al. (2011)
is comprised of five areas. Even though the five areas are highly correlated, a specific
area may have a different effect from another one, e.g. the size of government may
affect the cadre appointment differently from the development of legal frameworks.
The results of further investigation of the detailed economic freedom areas are re-
ported in Table 3.6. Column 1 results suggest that three out of the five areas have
significant effects on the Basic Biographical measure: ownership structure (privatiza-
tion), goods market development, and legal frameworks. Column 2 suggests that four
areas have significant effects on the Career measure: government and market, owner-
ship structure (privatization), factors market development, and legal frameworks. All
the signs in Columns 1 and 2 are consistent with those in Table 3.5: more economic
freedom reduces the designed differences between party chief and mayor.
Column 3 in Table 3.6 also suggests consistent results: government and market
and ownership structure are the two main driving forces increasing the ideological
differences between party chiefs and mayors. In a province with smaller government
size and more private economy, the ideological backgrounds of the party chief and the
mayor in their cities are more diverse. This ideological “checks and balances” should
help enable the ideological directions of these cities to be on the “right” track, following
direction from the central government. Moreover, factors market development and
legal frameworks also have significant effects on the total index now, as shown in
Column 4.
3.4.2 Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach Results
The second stage IV results for economic freedom are reported in Table 3.7, so
are the diagnostic tests for the first stage results. Overall, the signs and statistical
significances of economic freedom on Basic Biographical characteristics and Ideology
are comparable to those in Table 3.5. The p-value for F-test is less than 0.000, which
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rejects the null hypothesis that the Marriage Index is a weak IV. In other words, it is
a strong IV.
Three out of four p-values of the Wu-Hausman tests are greater than 0.1, which
fail to reject the null that economic freedom is exogenous at the 0.1 significance level.
Therefore, we should use OLS to estimate these three models which is more efficient.
The OLS model in this context is the fixed effects model with year fixed effects, and
the results are reported in Table 3.5. However, for Ideology, it is the only one with a
p-value (0.013) smaller than 0.1. Therefore, economic freedom is endogenous in this
case, and thus it is correct to use IV. The IV result for Ideology is comparable to that
in the main results section as reported in Table 3.5, positive and significant, while the
magnitude of IV coefficient is larger. Overall, the economic freedom’s effects from the
fixed effects models are robust.
I also conduct IV analyses for all the five areas of economic freedom, and the di-
agnostic tests statistics are reported in Table 3.8. The F-test p-values for all the five
areas are under 0.05, which suggest that the Marriage Index is a very strong IV for
all the five areas. Regarding the Wu-Hausman test statistics, Career and Total are
exogenous, and Basic Biographical characteristics and Ideology are endogenous, for
almost all the five areas. Thus, the IV results suggest the real causal relationships
between economic freedom areas and these two measures: the negative relationships
between economic freedom areas and Basic Biographical characteristics are not signif-
icant anymore, while the positive relationships between economic freedom areas and
Ideology are still significant and thus robust.
3.4.3 Robustness Tests
The constructed measures of the differences of party chief and mayors are discrete
and the gaps are all integers, which enables the analysis using an ordered probit model.
A year effect capturing the heterogeneity over time is also included when conducting
the ordered probit model analysis, and the results are reported in Table 3.9.
Table 3.9 shows that the overall economic freedom still reduces the Basic Biograph-
ical difference, which is consistent with that of the main model. Economic freedom
does not have a significant effect on the career experience difference nor the ideology
difference anymore. Table 3.9 also reports the results for detailed areas of economic
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freedom. The results for Basic Biographical and Ideology are very comparable to
those of the main model as reported in Table 3.6. Four out of five areas are having a
significantly negative effect on Basic Biographical difference. For ideology difference,
both government and market and ownership structure have a significantly positive
effect. Again, only factors market development has a significant effect on the career
experience difference.
It is possible that economic freedom has time lagged effects, i.e. the economic
freedom of province p in year t− 1, EFp t−1, influences the province level government’s
appointment decisions of prefecture city party chiefs and mayors in year t. Meanwhile,
it also takes some time for the province level committees to bargain, decide, and
execute these appointments. Therefore, I also conduct robustness tests while using
the lagged terms of economic freedom and its areas.
Table 3.10 reports the regression results of the fixed effects model with year fixed
effects for economic freedom and its areas, respectively. Unsurprisingly, they are very
comparable to those reported in the main results tables, Tables 3.5 and 3.6.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Facing the principal-agent problem, politicians need to take a loyalty-competence
trade-off in their personnel appointment decisions. In contemporary Chinese bureau-
cratic system, mid-level cadres are appointed via collective bargaining and decision
of the corresponding cadres above, and there are also horizontal bargaining on and
vertical bargaining across various levels of local governments. These make principal-
agent relationships more complicated. Cadres also move often, which makes continuous
long-term principal-agent or patron-client relationship even more difficult to maintain.
Therefore, more than focusing on one specific principal-agent relationship, cadres also
need to work on the horizontal “checks and balances” between local governments lead-
ers when making personnel appoints.
On the one hand, principals want their agents to be “matched” well, which will
enhance the cooperation and governing efficiency. On the other hand, principals also
want their agents to have some sort of “checks and balances”, thus principals can always
secure their loyalty by providing support when there are inner fights between agents.
By manipulating the “matching” between local leaders the agents, principals manage
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to control them. As suggested in Zhou (2020), institutions play an important role in
personnel appointments of local leaders in Chinese bureaucratic system. Therefore,
this paper focuses on how economic freedom influences the “matching” degree between
local leaders.
Using a recent data set documenting the biography information of prefecture city
party chiefs and mayors in China by Chen (2016), this research uses the biography
information of these officials as an approximation of their difference perceived by the
provincial level officials, which might further influence the appointments of city party
chiefs and mayors. Using the provincial level economic freedom data by Fan et al.
(2011), and a fixed effects model with year fixed effects also an instrumental variable
(IV) approach, this research finds that more economic freedom in one province reduces
the difference of basic biographical background (composed of gender, race, age, geo-
graphical origin, and education level) and career experience (whether they served in
military, youth league, or as assistant or secretary to a senior official) between party
chief and mayor. However, more economic freedom in one province increases the dif-
ference of ideology component (measured by the major of education, economist or not,
engineer or not, and whether the degree is from party school) between party chief and
mayor. It suggests that more “matched” city party chiefs and mayors are desired in re-
gions with more economic freedom, where governing efficiency is important. However,
more ideological difference also exists in regions with more economic freedom.
This research contributes to the current literature in several ways. First, it is the
first paper empirically studying how the province level economic institutions influence
the party organization’s decision on appointing prefecture city leaders. Second, it
is also the first paper investigating how economic institutions influence the designed
“match” between local leaders, which play an important role in the intervened principal-
agent relationships in the contemporary Chinese bureaucratic system. This research
also has limits. The biography difference of party chief and mayor does not equal
the real “matching” degree and the “checks and balances” between paired party chief
and mayor, while it is probably the closest measure available so far. Furthermore,
it is impossible to attain the real ideology of every official studied, while the current
measure used in this paper provides a good approximation. However, as the spirit
this research is following and developing, more work is necessary to further reveal the
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economic and political systems in socialist regimes.
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Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Party Chiefs and Mayors (2000-2009)
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Party_Gender 0.025 0.157 0 1
Party_Race 0.919 0.272 0 1
Party_Age 51.254 3.713 39 60
Party_Edu Score 3.801 0.770 0 5
Party_Military 0.097 0.296 0 1
Party_Youth League 0.336 0.472 0 1
Party_Assistance 0.613 0.487 0 1
Party_Economist 0.073 0.260 0 1
Party_Engineer 0.063 0.244 0 1
Party_Party School 0.569 0.495 0 1
Mayor_Gender 0.043 0.203 0 1
Mayor_Race 0.943 0.231 0 1
Mayor_Age 49.291 3.990 37 60
Mayor_Edu Score 3.396 1.425 0 5
Mayor_Military 0.070 0.255 0 1
Mayor_Youth League 0.392 0.488 0 1
Mayor_Assistance 0.615 0.487 0 1
Mayor_Economist 0.088 0.284 0 1
Mayor_Engineer 0.118 0.323 0 1
Mayor_Party School 0.604 0.489 0 1
N=1,786
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of the Difference between Party Chiefs and Mayors
(2000-2009)
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
P&M Dif_Basic Bio 1.812 0.888 0 5
P&M Dif_Career 1.109 0.821 0 3
P&M Dif_Ideology 1.088 0.930 0 4
P&M Dif_Total 4.008 1.562 0 9
P&M Dif_Gender (V1) 0.068 0.252 0 1
P&M Dif_Race (V2) 0.123 0.328 0 1
P&M Dif_Age (V3) 0.434 0.496 0 1
P&M Dif_City Born (V4) 0.916 0.277 0 1
P&M Dif_Edu Score (V5) 0.271 0.445 0 1
P&M Dif_Military (V6) 0.143 0.351 0 1
P&M Dif_Youth League (V7) 0.499 0.500 0 1
P&M Dif_Assistance (V8) 0.466 0.499 0 1
P&M Dif_Major (V9) 0.352 0.478 0 1
P&M Dif_Economist (V10) 0.143 0.351 0 1
P&M Dif_Engineer (V11) 0.152 0.359 0 1
P&M Dif_Party School (V12) 0.440 0.497 0 1
N=1,786
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Table 3.3: Correlation Coefficients of the 12 Difference Variables between Party Chief
and Mayor
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12
V1 1 0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.10 0.05 -0.02 -0.01
V2 0.03 1 0.01 0.06 0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.01
V3 -0.03 0.01 1 0.06 0.12 -0.004 -0.03 -0.02 0.10 -0.07 0.04 0.08
V4 0.02 0.06 0.06 1 -0.01 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.11
V5 -0.02 0.06 0.12 -0.01 1 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.08
V6 -0.01 -0.03 -0.004 0.10 -0.03 1 -0.04 0.06 0.03 0.01 -0.09 -0.02
V7 0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.10 -0.03 -0.04 1 0.09 -0.02 -0.03 -0.07 0.08
V8 0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.07 -0.06 0.06 0.09 1 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.02
V9 -0.10 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 1 -0.01 0.12 0.16
V10 0.05 0.04 -0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 1 -0.04 0.02
V11 -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 0.12 -0.04 1 0.08
V12 -0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.11 0.08 -0.02 0.08 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.08 1
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics of the Control Variables (2000-2009)
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Economic Freedom 6.599 1.848 2.670 11.800
Government and Market 7.969 1.423 3.190 10.530
Ownership Structure 7.472 3.049 0.680 13.730
Goods Market Development 7.713 1.460 −0.160 10.230
Factors Market Development 4.366 1.646 0.800 8.730
Legal Frameworks 5.481 2.907 1.150 19.850
Border 0.236 0.425 0 1
Minority 0.059 0.236 0 1
Province GDP(10k CNY) 10,049.990 8,355.712 295.020 39,482.560
Province Population(10k) 5,937.704 2,486.767 552 10,130
Province Fixed Investment(%) 46.974 13.514 25.764 89.346
Province Trade(%) 29.488 37.613 3.707 158.078
Province College Employee(%) 0.121 0.046 0.040 0.259
City GDP(10k CNY) 736.867 909.095 31.770 9,138.210
Marriage(10k) 43.288 20.323 2.970 91.720
First Marriage(10k) 79.799 37.880 5.440 166.240
Remarriage(10k) 7.054 4.243 0.250 21.420
Divorce(10k) 14.816 7.712 0.780 39.940
Marriage Index 0.293 0.137 0.105 0.904
N=1,786
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Table 3.5: Year Fixed Effects Model Results
Basic Bio Career Ideology Total
Economic Freedom −0.095∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ 0.071∗ −0.072
(0.034) (0.018) (0.037) (0.044)
Log Province GDP −0.463∗∗∗ 0.160 −0.200 −0.504∗∗
(0.132) (0.099) (0.130) (0.209)
Log Province Population 0.444∗∗∗ −0.035 0.040 0.449
(0.128) (0.089) (0.167) (0.281)
Province Fixed Effects (%) 0.001 −0.002 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Province Trade (%) 0.005∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.001 0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Province College Employee (%) 1.769∗∗ −0.644∗ −1.530∗∗ −0.405
(0.820) (0.388) (0.738) (0.882)
Minority 0.635∗∗∗ 0.060 0.036 0.730∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.055) (0.129) (0.123)
Border 0.292∗∗∗ −0.283∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.129∗
(0.029) (0.052) (0.057) (0.069)
Log City GDP 0.028 −0.026 0.122∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.032) (0.021) (0.034)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Num. obs. 1786 1786 1786 1786
R2 (full model) 0.135 0.032 0.025 0.043
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 3.6: Year Fixed Effects Model Results for Economic Freedom Areas
Basic Bio Career Ideology Total
Government and Market −0.049 −0.031∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.017
(0.033) (0.011) (0.025) (0.050)
Ownership Structure −0.033∗ −0.018∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.018) (0.010) (0.016) (0.028)
Goods Market Development −0.043∗∗ 0.017 0.008 −0.017
(0.018) (0.015) (0.010) (0.025)
Factors Market Development −0.024 −0.049∗∗∗ −0.013 −0.086∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.036) (0.052)
Legal Frameworks −0.026∗∗ −0.021∗ 0.003 −0.044∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020)
Economic Controls Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y
Geographic Controls Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Num. obs. 1786 1786 1786 1786
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 3.7: Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach Results and Diagnostic Tests
Basic Bio Career Ideology Total
Economic Freedom −0.400∗ 0.242 0.651∗∗∗ 0.493
(0.213) (0.219) (0.252) (0.438)
Log Province GDP 0.295 −0.558 −1.644∗∗∗ −1.907∗
(0.535) (0.558) (0.630) (1.106)
Log Province Population −0.163 0.539 1.196∗∗ 1.572∗
(0.439) (0.463) (0.516) (0.911)
Province Fixed Investment(%) 0.006 −0.007 −0.006 −0.007
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009)
Province Trade(%) 0.009∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.008∗∗ −0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Province College Employee(%) −0.240 1.257 2.295 3.313
(1.566) (1.530) (1.816) (3.111)
Minority 0.318 0.359 0.639∗∗ 1.316∗∗
(0.234) (0.258) (0.300) (0.517)
Border 0.123 −0.124 0.442∗∗∗ 0.441∗
(0.132) (0.128) (0.152) (0.259)
Log City GDP 0.024 −0.023 0.129∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗
(0.030) (0.028) (0.033) (0.052)
(0.595) (0.622) (0.694) (1.116)
F-Test P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wu-Hausman Test P-value 0.141 0.165 0.013 0.177
Year Factor Y Y Y Y
R2 0.096 -0.008 -0.103 0.000
Num. obs. 1786 1786 1786 1786
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.8: Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach Results and Diagnostic Tests for
Economic Freedom Areas
Basic Bio Career Ideology Total
Government and Market −0.810 0.489 1.318∗∗ 0.996
(0.493) (0.479) (0.652) (0.952)
F-Test P-value 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Wu-Hausman Test P-value 0.075 0.224 0.011 0.255
Ownership Structure −0.543 0.328 0.884∗∗ 0.668
(0.331) (0.321) (0.430) (0.634)
F-Test P-value 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Wu-Hausman Test P-value 0.073 0.227 0.010 0.255
Goods Market Development −0.670 0.404 1.090∗ 0.824
(0.443) (0.393) (0.628) (0.810)
F-Test P-value 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018
Wu-Hausman Test P-value 0.075 0.278 0.006 0.237
Factors Market Development −0.843 0.509 1.371∗ 1.037
(0.540) (0.490) (0.708) (0.980)
F-Test P-value 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Wu-Hausman Test P-value 0.065 0.212 0.006 0.211
Legal Frameworks −0.148∗ 0.090 0.241∗∗∗ 0.183
(0.079) (0.080) (0.090) (0.160)
F-Test P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wu-Hausman Test P-value 0.110 0.151 0.006 0.142
Year Factor Y Y Y Y
Num. obs. 1786 1786 1786 1786
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.9: Ordered Probit Results
Basic Bio Career Ideology Total
Economic Freedom −0.132∗∗∗ −0.063 0.074 −0.047
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.042)
Government and Market −0.068∗ −0.038 0.101∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035)
Ownership Structure −0.043∗ −0.022 0.067∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Goods Market Development −0.059∗∗ 0.024 0.012 −0.011
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025)
Factors Market Development −0.035 −0.072∗ −0.015 −0.057
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.037)
Legal Frameworks −0.036∗ −0.029 −0.001 −0.030
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Economic Controls Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y
Geographic Controls Y Y Y Y
Year Effect Y Y Y Y
Num. obs. 1786 1786 1786 1786
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.10: Year Fixed Effects Results - Lagged EF
Basic Bio Career Ideology Total
Economic Freedomp t−1 −0.109∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗ 0.102∗∗ −0.054
(0.029) (0.018) (0.043) (0.052)
Government and Marketp t−1 −0.040∗ 0.001 0.092∗∗∗ 0.053
(0.024) (0.022) (0.025) (0.045)
Ownership Structurep t−1 −0.034∗∗ −0.011 0.075∗∗∗ 0.030
(0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.030)
Goods Market Developmentp t−1 −0.065∗∗∗ 0.000 0.014 −0.051
(0.023) (0.016) (0.017) (0.040)
Factors Market Developmentp t−1 0.001 −0.024 0.000 −0.022
(0.014) (0.029) (0.039) (0.063)
Legal Frameworksp t−1 −0.040∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ 0.015 −0.069∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.012) (0.024) (0.024)
Economic Controls Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y
Geographic Controls Y Y Y Y
Year Effect Y Y Y Y
Num. obs. 1495 1495 1495 1495
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Figure 3.1: Economic Freedom in Chinese Provinces
Note: Blank areas suggest that the data are missing. Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan
are not included in the analysis, since they are not in “Mainland China”. Beijing,
Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin are not included in the Chen (2016) data set, be-
cause the government leaders of these four direct-administered municipalities are called
“mayors”, while they are actually “governors” of these provincial level regions and thus
have a de facto higher rank; so are the party chiefs of them. The figures are only for
economic analysis and do not represent the political views of the author.
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Figure 3.2: Basic Biographical Difference in Chinese Provinces
Note: Blank areas suggest that the data are missing. Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan
are not included in the analysis, since they are not in “Mainland China”. Beijing,
Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin are not included in the Chen (2016) data set, be-
cause the government leaders of these four direct-administered municipalities are called
“mayors”, while they are actually “governors” of these provincial level regions and thus
have a de facto higher rank; so are the party chiefs of them. The figures are only for
economic analysis and do not represent the political views of the author.
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Figure 3.3: Career Difference in Chinese Provinces
Note: Blank areas suggest that the data are missing. Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan
are not included in the analysis, since they are not in “Mainland China”. Beijing,
Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin are not included in the Chen (2016) data set, be-
cause the government leaders of these four direct-administered municipalities are called
“mayors”, while they are actually “governors” of these provincial level regions and thus
have a de facto higher rank; so are the party chiefs of them. The figures are only for
economic analysis and do not represent the political views of the author.
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Figure 3.4: Ideology Difference in Chinese Provinces
Note: Blank areas suggest that the data are missing. Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan
are not included in the analysis, since they are not in “Mainland China”. Beijing,
Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin are not included in the Chen (2016) data set, be-
cause the government leaders of these four direct-administered municipalities are called
“mayors”, while they are actually “governors” of these provincial level regions and thus
have a de facto higher rank; so are the party chiefs of them. The figures are only for
economic analysis and do not represent the political views of the author.
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